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Summary 
The purpose of this thesis has been to highlight, in a lean perspective, where and why 
waste occurs in two different supply chains both serving Ulstein shipyard with 
components. The first supply chain consists of GS-Hydro, supplying B- and C- 
components to Ulstein Verft, while the other supply chain consists of Brunvoll, supplying 
A-components to Ulstein Verft. This thesis is a part of the Lean shipbuilding II research 
program with Ulstein Verft and Molde research institute, and is the first study to 
investigate where delays and interruptions occur in the supply network of a shipyard.  
 
Therefore, an exploratory-explanatory, qualitative case study approach was selected. 
Evidence was mainly collected through open-ended interviews, observations, and archival 
records and documentations. The theory has been centred on lean, supply chain 
management (SCM) and lean SCM.  
 
The findings suggest that waste in the flow of materials from GS-Hydro to Ulstein Verft is 
related to excessive inventory, excessive transportation and waiting. This is caused by the 
lack of collaboration and coordination between the two firms. The analysis on the 
information flow between Brunvoll and Ulstein Verft revealed three features in the 
procurement process as having large impact on lead time and increased the complexity of 
the information flow; competitive bidding, high level of customisation and change orders, 
and waiting. The sources of this were mainly the concurrent engineering nature, high level 
of transactional contracting and lack of coordination between the two firms. For the 
internal flow of materials within the shipyard, wastes identified were related to excessive 
inventory, excessive transportation and waiting. This mainly caused by lack of planning, 
control and coordination. The actual findings corresponded with previous findings in the 
theory.  
 
The thesis concludes that lean SCM principles can be applied to reduce and eliminate 
waste in the supply chains serving Ulstein shipyard or other Norwegian shipyards, but 
emphasises the importance of taking the lean SCM principles of continuous flow, pull, 
collaboration and value stream thinking, and develop specific tools and methods tailored to 
the Norwegian shipbuilding industry, rather than directly copying tools and techniques 
from other industries as a means to eliminate waste in the supply chains.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Background 
The Norwegian shipbuilding industry is recognised for its high quality, high delivery 
reliability and competence in building complex and highly customised specialised 
vessels such as offshore service vessels (OSVs) and seismic vessels.  This competence 
has developed over the years as the high costs of labour in Norway have made it 
difficult for the Norwegian shipyards to compete with shipyards in low-cost countries 
in building standardised low-cost vessels (NOU 2005).  
 
However, the industry has over the last years struggled to remain profitable and 
competitive due to several challenges. Firstly, before the financial crisis, the Norwegian 
shipyards experienced an order boom causing problems for the shipyards to finish 
projects on time due to lack of capacity, of both labour and supply and low supplier 
reliability. This resulted in costly delays and low margins for the shipyards (Aslesen 
2007; Hervik et al. 2011). Secondly, during the financial crisis the shipyards 
experienced a decrease in orders for new vessels. This combined with increasing 
competition from shipyards in low-cost countries, resulted in pessimistic outlooks for 
the Norwegian shipbuilding industry in the years during the recession, with many of the 
shipyards not receiving new orders (Hervik et al. 2010).  
 
Although Hervik et al. (2011) report an increase in order levels and the margins for the 
shipyards in Møre and Romsdal for the years after the recession, the future prospects 
for the shipbuilding industry are somewhat mixed. On one hand, the current economic 
climate regarding the debt crisis of several EU countries, the US and Japan is a source 
of uncertainty regarding the funding of new ships. On the other hand, however, the 
discoveries of new oil fields of the coast of Norway, as well as in Brazil, Australia, of 
the coast of West-Africa and Brunei have resulted in optimism for the future of the 
Norwegian shipyards building offshore service vessels that are capable of serving the 
new challenges in current markets, such as the increasing complexity in subsea 
operations. In addition, Hervik et al. (2011) point to how the offshore service industry is 
currently renewing their fleet, as well the offshore industry will have to increase their 
capacity as a result of the new oil field discoveries. Consequently, the future prospects 
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for the Norwegian shipbuilding industry are mixed between optimism regarding the 
new oil fields and pessimism regarding the international economic climate.  
 
The challenge for the Norwegian shipyards, however, is to maintain a quality, 
technological and innovative advantage while reducing costs and lead time for building 
a vessel, in an industry with frequent change orders, global supply chains and the 
competition from shipyards in low- cost countries, particularly as shipyards in low- cost 
countries are starting to investigate the possibility of building same type of vessels as 
the Norwegian shipyards (Hervik et al. 2011, 2010).  
In order to address these challenges, Ulstein Verft AS (hereafter referred to as Ulstein) 
in cooperation with the Norwegian research council’s innovation program MAROFF, 
the shipyards STX Europe and Kleven Maritime as well as Molde University College 
(MUC) and Møreforskning Molde (MFM) engaged in a research- and development 
project named Lean shipbuilding- innovative shipbuilding in a Norwegian context from 
2006 to 2009. Inspired by the concept of lean construction, the goal was to tailor lean 
thinking to the project-based production of the Norwegian shipbuilding industry by 
enhancing the understanding of the Norwegian shipbuilding industry in a lean context, 
as well as developing lean methods and tools to the industry.  
 
As a part of this initiative, Ulstein started implementing the Last Planner system for 
planning and control in 2006. The Last Planner is a planning tool divided in different 
levels, hierarchically organised. In contrast to traditional planning tools where the 
master plan often dictates the weekly working plan through a “push” approach, the Last 
Planner uses a “pull” approach where the weekly work tasks are assigned based on what 
activities which are actually feasible to complete. This is decided by the Last Planner 
(weekly work plan), while the roles of the other planning levels are to facilitate and 
make ready for the completion of the activities. There are seven preconditions, or flows, 
that have to present to ensure the feasibility to complete an activity. These are materials, 
information, personnel, equipment, prior work, space and external conditions. 
Furthermore, the executing level is responsible to carry out analysis with respect to plan 
and actual completion, often using percentage plan complete (PPC), to understand 
reasons for failure to complete tasks and to take corrective actions (Mossman 2005).  
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After the implementation of the Last Planner, Ulstein has experienced increased 
transparency in the projects with respect to flows required to complete an activity and 
increased knowledge of sources of variability and uncertainty in the projects (Toftesund 
2007).  
Currently, Ulstein in cooperation with MUC, MFM and FAFO are continuing the work 
to develop a new concept for shipbuilding based on lean principles in a new research 
project entitled Lean Shipbuilding part II. The aim is to increase productivity and 
reduce the costs of building ships in Norway. The research project has two main focus 
areas:  
 Project logistics   
The concept is developed to emphasise that project based production has its own 
logistics, both concerning the physical flows and organisational aspects in a 
value chain perspective. 
 Social logistics 
The concept is used to emphasise the social cooperation required in a project 
based production setting, with the basis of the mutual dependency between 
activities and functions.  
 
Within the project logistics focus area there are three targets; (1) to develop and test 
methods to improve the internal flows in the shipyard of information, equipment, 
personnel and particularly materials, (2) to develop and tests methods to improve the 
external flow of materials and components to the shipyard and (3) to identify 
bottlenecks with respect to external production, as a basis of developing efficient 
organisational solutions.  
This thesis is a part of the Lean shipbuilding part II research project within the project 
logistics focus area. The purpose and scope of the thesis will be described in the next 
section.  
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1.2. Purpose and scope of study 
The ultimate goal of the lean shipbuilding research at Ulstein described above is to 
develop the Ulstein Production system (UPS), a production system based on lean 
principles and techniques tailored for the specific characteristics and facilities of Ulstein 
(Toftesund 2007). The first step towards the UPS has mainly been related to planning 
and control with the implementation of the Last Planner system. In addition, research 
has been conducted on work-time utilisation and warehouse management at Ulstein. 
The findings from the work-time utilisation study indicated that only 27 percent of the 
time was actually value adding, while the warehouse management research highlighted 
challenges in the warehouse such lack of space and excessive workload for the 
warehouse personnel (Ugland and Gjerstad 2010; Longva 2009).  
 
The current research project “Lean Shipbuilding part II”, focusing on the concepts of 
projects logistics and social logistics as described above, is the second step towards the 
UPS. Longva (2009) describes that the ultimate vision for Ulstein for the material flow 
within the shipyard is that required materials should be transported to production 
workers just-in-time and possibly as work packages which include drawings, tools and 
components for whole work operations.  
As a part of this, this thesis will focus on the flow of materials into production. More 
specifically, this study will investigate both the external flow of materials to the 
shipyard, and the internal flow of materials within the shipyard.  
Furthermore, since this is the first study investigating the flow of materials after the 
introduction of Lean Shipbuilding at Ulstein, the purpose of this study is to contribute 
to the understanding of what in the value stream that delays and interrupts the flow of 
materials, and why these delays and/or interruptions occur. The research problem for 
this study will be described in the next section. 
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1.3. Research problem  
Mossman (2007) put forward that project logistics create no value in itself, except for 
the assembly or processing work, but is rather a process of aligning the operations 
needed to deliver a structure or building.  
 
Reflecting on this, one may argue that even though project logistics creates no value in 
itself, aligning the activities and operations required to deliver a ship is crucial to obtain 
a continuous flow of materials, with the result of shorter lead times and lower costs.  
As outlined above, this is the current focus of the research at Ulstein. In addition, when 
GS-Hydro, a supplier of standard components changed from several regional to one 
central warehouse in 2011, this added further interest to what activities in the value 
stream that delay the flow of materials. Particularly as this, from Ulstein’s point of 
view, resulted in materials were received later on the delivery route with more 
variability.  
Polat and Ballard  (2003) put forward that the main purpose of supply chains is to 
maximise operational efficiency, profitability and competitive advantage of the partners 
involved by fulfilling the needs of the end- customer, and the supply chain performance 
can be measured with metrics such as time, cost and quality. Mentzer et al. (2001) 
describe how a supply chain consist of all the parties  (three or more) directly involved 
in the upstream and downstream flows of products, services, finances and/or 
information from a source to a customer.  
Although a supply chain consists of more than two parties, within the boundary 
conditions of this thesis only Ulstein and a first tier supplier will be considered.  
The research problem of this thesis is to investigate the flow of materials in a lean 
perspective of two different supply chains serving Ulstein, with a particular focus on 
what is delaying the flow of materials in the two supply chains and the sources of these 
delays. One can expect that delays occur due to non-value adding activities, constraints 
or bottlenecks, or other structural arrangements in the supply chains. The research 
question is therefore:  
 
What causes delays in the flow of materials in two different supply chains serving the 
same shipyard, and what are the underlying sources of these delays? 
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The supply chains are different with respect of the type of components flowing through 
the value stream. The first supply chain consists of Ulstein and GS-Hydro. The 
components supplied by GS-Hydro are mainly standardised and include for instance 
pipes, tubes and valves. For each vessel a vast number of these components are 
required, with each component having a relatively low unit value. The materials 
flowing in this value stream can therefore be described as high-volume–low-value 
components. The volume and type of components Ulstein orders from GS-Hydro varies 
from project to project, depending on the size and type of vessel, rather than direct 
specifications from the client. Due to the current nature of this value stream, the main 
focus will be on the flow of materials from Ulstein places an order to the components 
are received, stored and used at Ulstein. Within this, some consideration will be made 
to how GS-Hydro manage their suppliers (tier 2 suppliers)  as well as the impact of GS-
Hydro’s change from regional to a central warehouse on the flow of materials will be 
discussed.  
The second supply chain consists of Ulstein and Brunvoll. Brunvoll is a supplier of 
thrusters to Ulstein, and the components flowing in this value stream can be described 
as low-volume-high-value components. In addition, the thrusters are complex, and can 
be highly customised with respect to the specifications from the client. In addition, each 
thruster is also an independent project at Brunvoll.  As the components flowing in this 
value stream require more detailed engineering and specifications compared to the 
value stream consisting of GS-Hydro, and since Brunvoll is not an active participant in 
this thesis, the main focus will be on the information flow from Ulstein initiates contact 
with Brunvoll, and the flow of materials within the shipyard. The Brunvoll- Ulstein 
supply chain link will be evaluated in terms of Ulstein’s build no.295.   
Consequently, there are clear differences in the two value streams in terms of 
complexity and size of the components, lead time and the location and production 
system of the suppliers.  
Due to these differences, one may expect differences in the performance of the two 
supply chains and also differences in waste. The two supply chains will therefore be 
compared with respect to waste and sources of waste.  
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1.4. Outline of thesis 
This thesis is divided into five main chapters: the introduction, the literature review, the 
methodology, case study findings, and the discussion and conclusion.  
The first chapter will introduce the background, the purpose of the study as well as the 
research problem and limitations of the study.  
The literature review is focusing on lean theory and supply chain management (SCM), 
including the concepts of lean principles, lean construction and shipbuilding, as well as 
concepts within SCM, and lean SCM. This chapter will provide the theoretical 
background for the case study and discussion.  
Following this, the methodology chapter describes how the research problem will be 
aimed to be solved through an exploratory-explanatory case study, and the data 
collection methods used.  
The case study findings will describe the findings in the current state of the two supply 
chains. In both cases the current state will be mapped and described and the waste 
identified will be discussed.  
Finally, in the last chapter the sources of waste in the two supply chain will be 
discussed and compared, before the conclusion will summarise the findings of this 
thesis and the corresponding managerial implications and further studies will be 
outlined.  
1.5. Limitations   
This thesis is based on a qualitative research, as requested by Ulstein. Consequently, the 
findings are not supported by a quantitative analysis of the value streams. This means 
that statements and perceptions from selected employees along with observations and 
some archival records will be used as evidence to support the findings, instead of 
quantitative evidence such as statistical calculations or mathematical models. The 
archival records that are used in the analysis of the value streams are used in the sense 
of indicating where delays may occur, rather than for thorough scientific analysis. The 
result is a qualitative understanding and indication of where and why delays occur in 
the flow of materials in the value streams, which is also in coherence with the purpose 
of the study.  
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Similarly, with respect to the discussion concerning the impact of GS-Hydro’s change 
to a central warehouse, the thesis will not conduct a quantitative analysis or go into 
other details about the ideal location and number of warehouses, but rather highlight the 
impact the change has had on the flow of materials from a qualitative perspective based 
on the supply chain partners’ views.  
 
Another limitation of the thesis is that Brunvoll is not participating in the research. 
Brunvoll is not participating due to lack of time and resources available, as a result of 
high order levels and time consuming implementation of a new ERP system. To deal 
with this, Brunvoll is treated as a “black box”, and the value stream is only considered 
from Ulstein’s view. As a consequence, the analysis of this value stream lacks to some 
degree a holistic perspective.  
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2. Literature review 
 
This section will review the relevant literature for this research. The first part will give a 
brief introduction to lean philosophy, including lean production, lean wastes and lean 
principles. Following this, some lean tools will be outlined, before the concept of lean 
construction will be discussed. After that, this chapter will go into more detail on more 
specific literature for this thesis. This will include a review of peculiarities of the 
shipbuilding industry, and how the concept of lean can be applied to shipbuilding. This 
will be followed by a discussing of the supply chain management (SCM) concept, and 
how SCM can be related to construction and shipbuilding including what is currently 
being considered as waste in construction supply chains. Lastly, important factors to 
achieve lean SCM will be discussed.    
2.1. Lean philosophy 
Lean philosophy is a production philosophy originating from the Toyota production 
system (TPS), with a focus on eliminating and reducing non- value adding activities. It 
gained particular interest from the rest of the world as a result of performance gap 
between Toyota and other car manufacturers (Holweg 2006).  Lean philosophy offers a 
way to do more with less; “less human effort, less equipment, less time and less space- 
while coming closer and closer to providing customers with exactly what they want” 
(Womack and Jones 2003, 15).  
Furthermore, lean thinking provides a method to specify value, line-up value creating 
activities in the best sequence, use pull- techniques and achieve continuous 
improvement (Womack and Jones 2003). Further elements of a lean philosophy are 
discussed below.  
2.1.1. Lean production 
From its origin in the TPS, the term lean production was first coined by Womack et al. 
(1990) in the book “The machine that changed the World” to describe the philosophy 
of the TPS. Although lean production originated from the TPS, the fundamental 
principles of lean production is not culturally bound to Japan, but rather universally 
applicable (Holweg 2006; Womack, Jones, and Roos 1990). 
Lean production is a business philosophy which spreads across all areas of production, 
including the supply chain, with the focus on eliminating non-value adding time 
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without compromising quality or on-time delivery (Womack, Jones, and Roos 1990). It 
is also defined as a method of manufacturing that focuses on shortening the time 
between customer order and the delivery by eliminating sources of waste, with waste 
being defined as anything that does not add value to the end product, while using less of 
everything compared to traditional mass production; less human effort in the factory, 
less manufacturing space, less investment in tools, less engineering hours, and less 
inventory in a warehouse (Liker and Lamb 2000; Womack and Jones 2003).   
Shah and Ward (2007, 791) define Lean production as “integrated socio-technical 
system whose main objective is to eliminate waste by concurrently reducing or 
minimizing supplier, customer, and internal variability”.  
 
It is important to emphasise that Lean philosophy is not about copying the principles 
and tools of Toyota, but rather developing principles that are suitable to the specific 
organisations, for instance a shipyard, and diligently practicing them to achieve high 
performance that continues to add value to customers and society (Liker 2004). 
Correspondingly, Picchi (2001) put forward that lean thinking can be viewed from three 
levels; philosophy, system and techniques, where the philosophy view is a conceptual 
aspect, the system view is a coordination aspect and techniques is an operational aspect. 
He emphasises that the philosophy behind the systems and techniques is the most 
important element, particularly because direct applicability of techniques from one 
industry to another is limited due to specific characteristics of different industries 
(Picchi 2001).  
2.1.2. Lean principles  
Furthermore, Womack and Jones (2003) put forward lean thinking as a cyclic route to 
seek perfection, centred around four principles seeking a fifth: 
1) Specify value 
Value should be defined by the end customer, in terms of product 
specification meeting the requirements of the end customer at a specific 
time and price.  
2) Identify value stream 
Identify all the activities necessary to bring the product to the market, and 
eliminate activities that do not add value to the end product.  
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3) Create an uninterrupted flow 
Make the value adding activities flow through the value stream to the end 
customer without obstacles such as delays and inventories.  
4) Establish pull 
The reduced lead time from the first three principles should facilitate for only 
producing to a signal from a downstream customer.  
5) Seek perfection 
The previous principles should allow for continuous improvement with the aim 
of maximising value for customers while eliminating waste.  
 
Hines, Holweg and Rich (2004) argue that value is often seen equal to cost reduction, 
and thus there has been a tendency of lean thinking to focus on waste and cost 
reduction. However, as Womack and Jones put value in the first principle, they argue 
that lean has moved away from a “shop-floor-focus” on solely waste elimination and 
cost reduction, to focus on both enhancing the value for customers and the removal of 
wasteful activities (Hines, Holweg, and Rich 2004).  
 
In lean, activities can be categorised into three categories (Hines and Rich 1997):  
 Value-adding activities (VAA) 
Value adding activities are activities producing value to the end product. The 
aim is to create a continuous flow of value adding activities.  
 Non-value adding, but necessary activities (NNVA) 
Non-value adding, but necessary activities are activities not adding value to the 
end-product, but are necessary for the value adding activities to occur. These 
should be minimised, as complete elimination would often require major 
changes in the system, which may not be feasible in the short-term.  
 Non-value adding (NVA) 
Non-value adding activities are pure waste, because they do not add any value to 
the end- product. These should ideally be eliminated completely.  
 
Both NNVA and NVA activities are considered waste in lean. However, Koskela 
(2000) point out that some NNVA, such as planning and accounting, might produce 
value for internal customers, and should thus not be reduced without considering 
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whether more non-value adding activities would occur in other parts of the value 
stream.  The waste aspect in lean will be further elaborated in the next section.  
2.1.3. Waste 
A fundamental aspect of lean production is the identification, elimination and 
prevention of waste, with waste being defined as anything that does not add value from 
the customers’ (either internal or external) perspective. In addition to the original seven 
sources of waste in lean described below, two additional sources of waste have been 
added later; “design of goods and services that fail to meet the user’s needs” and 
“unused employee creativity” (Hines and Rich 1997). However, only the original seven 
described below will be considered in this thesis. 
 
 Overproduction 
Overproduction is generally considered to be the most serious source of 
waste because it discourages a continuous flow of goods and services, and 
is likely to inhibit quality and productivity. Overproduction refers to 
producing too much, too early or “just in case”.  
 Waiting 
Waiting occurs when time is not used efficiently, and this waste occurs 
when goods are not being moved or worked on. This affects both workers 
and materials, both spending time waiting.  
 Excessive transportation 
Every movement of goods can be considered waste, so the aim is usually 
to minimise transportation, rather than total removal. In addition, 
excessive movement and double handling of goods increases the risk of 
goods being damaged.  
 Excessive inventory 
Reducing excess inventory is critical as it tends to increase lead time, 
preventing fast identification of problems and increase space requirements. 
Unnecessary inventory can also relate to having material available too far 
in advance of when it is needed in production, thus increasing holding 
costs and likelihood for damaged goods. 
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 Inappropriate processing 
This source of waste involves processing materials with overly complex 
machinery or equipment, or with unnecessary steps.  
 Unnecessary motion 
This source of waste involves employees’ motion during their work, such 
as stretching and bending. These motions are tiring for the employees, and 
should be avoided or minimised, because they are likely to lead to lower 
productivity and often quality problems. 
 Defects (rework) 
Producing defect parts is considered waste as it requires rework and 
quality inspections which are wasted handling, time and effort.  
 
 
Koskela (2000, 58) argue that there are three root causes of these non-value adding 
activities: 
1) The structure of the production system 
The flow of material and information is determined by the structure of the 
system, thus the amount of waste is related to the design of the system. 
Similarly, the site layout determines the flow of materials, and thus the 
amount of waste, between workstations. 
2) The way production is controlled 
This affects waste in at least two ways; (1) the control principles used may 
produce waste and deficiencies or (2) ignorance, in conforming to the control 
principles may produce waste.  
3) The inherent nature of production 
Waste exists in the inherent nature of production such as machine 
breakdowns, accidents and human error.   
 
The TPS house, illustrated in figure 1, can be used to summarise lean production and 
the TPS. However, it is important to stress again that the purpose of lean production is 
not to copy the tools and principles of the TPS, but rather to develop tools and 
principles that are suitable to a specific organisation.  
The basic idea of the TPS house is that every component has to be in place to keep the 
house steady. The goals are showed in the roof of the house; provide best quality at the 
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lowest cost, with the shortest lead time with best safety and high moral through 
shortening the production flow by eliminating waste.  
Of the two building pillars, Just-in-time (JIT) ensures that the components are delivered 
when they are need, in the right amount at the right place, while built-in quality ensures 
that products are produced with the right quality with no defects. JIT and built-in 
quality are mutually reinforcing, creating a JIT flow leads to increased quality and 
without inventory buffers the JIT systems will fail if there are frequent quality problems 
that interrupt the flow (Liker and Lamb 2000; Liker 2004).  
 
 
 
Figure 1: TPS House (based on Liker (2004)) 
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2.2. Lean tools 
In this section, the lean tools of value stream mapping (VSM) and 5S will be described. 
Although there are several lean tools, only these two are considered in this thesis. VSM 
is selected as this is a tool aiming to highlight non-value adding activities in the value 
streams, thus highly relevant for this thesis. 5S is selected because this is a tool aiming 
to organise the workplace to facilitate for a better flow and also as it was put forward by 
Longva (2009) as a way of improving warehouse management at Ulstein.  
 
2.2.1. Value stream mapping 
Value stream mapping (VSM) is a method to visualise and analyse the value streams by 
creating a map of the flow of materials from the supplier to the end customer, and the 
flow of information between the parties in the value stream. VSM facilitates for the 
identification of waste and the root causes (Kocakülâh, Brown, and Thomson 2008).  
The purpose of VSM is to highlight sources of waste and eliminate them by 
implementing a future-state value stream, with the aim of having a value stream where 
the processes are linked to their customers by either continuous flow or pull, with each 
process being as close as possible to producing only what its customers require when 
they require it (Rother and Shook 2009).  
There are four phases in VSM; 1) Selecting a product family, 2) create current state 
map, 3) create a future state map and 4) implementing. These four stages are described 
below (Rother and Shook 2009). 
 
1) Selecting a product family 
This is setting the boundary conditions for the value stream map, as drawing all 
product flows on one map is considered too complicated. A product family is a 
group of products that flow through similar processing steps using common 
equipment in the value stream.  
2) Create current-state map 
Using measurements such as cycle time, value-creating time and lead time, the 
current-state map highlights waste in the value stream and serves as the basis for 
developing a future state map.  
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3) Create future-state map 
A future-state map is created where the waste from the current-state map is 
eliminated or at least reduced and the materials are pulled through the value 
stream in a smooth flow.   
4) Implementation  
The difference between the current- and the future-state map serves as a road 
map to start implementing the performance improvements (Arbulu and 
Tommelein 2002).  
2.2.2. 5S 
While VSM is often considered to be the basic tool for management to start 
implementation of a lean philosophy, the 5S tool is a method for keeping the workplace 
clean and organised, as a foundation for further improvements (Kocakülâh, Brown, and 
Thomson 2008). It was originally developed by Toyota to describe the proper methods 
of housekeeping, as a well organised workplace is necessary for stability. The 5S’s, 
sort, straighten, shine, standardise and sustain, refer to the words included in the process 
of making the workplace clean and organised, and thus eliminate waste resulting from a 
poorly organised working area (Kocakülâh, Brown, and Thomson 2008; Liker and 
Lamb 2002).  
1) Sort 
Refers to the process of separating needed items from what is not needed, and 
removing the unneeded materials and tools.  
2) Straighten  
Involves defining a specific place for the needed items within the area they are 
needed, in order to facilitate for a continuous workflow and to minimise motion.  
3) Shine 
Focuses on cleanliness, and ensures that the workplace is kept organised, clean 
and ready for inspection.  
4) Standardise 
Focuses on maintaining and monitoring the first three Ss. These should enable 
standardisation of the best practice for the workplace. 
5) Sustain 
Maintaining a stabilised and organised workplace is an on-going process of 
continuous improvement.  
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2.3. Lean construction 
This section will introduce the concept of lean construction. First, the history of 
construction and lean construction will be outlined, before the elements and 
peculiarities of construction will be described. Lastly, lean construction will be 
compared and contrasted with traditional construction.  
 
2.3.1. History  
Construction is a very old industry, with many of its cultures and methods having their 
roots in periods before scientific analysis. Nevertheless, after the Second World War, 
there have been many initiatives trying to understand construction industries and the 
problems within construction industries, as well as trying to develop corresponding 
solutions and improvement methods. Among these solutions and improvement 
methods, Koskela (1992) recognises strategic initiatives such as industrialisation, 
computer integrated construction and total quality management. Operational and 
tactical techniques that have been developed include project planning and control tools, 
organisational methods, project success factors and productivity improvement methods 
(Koskela 1992). Furthermore, Picchi (2001) suggest that construction has been one of 
the first industries to discuss lean philosophy outside a manufacturing environment .  
 
On the other hand, the construction industries have rejected several ideas from 
manufacturing due to the belief that construction is different from manufacturing. More 
specifically, ideas from manufacturing have been rejected due to the fundamental 
differences between unique and complex construction projects in highly uncertain 
environments and mass production. However, Howell (1999) argue that waste in 
construction with a traditional project management approach arises from the same 
activity-centred focus as in manufacturing, namely by focusing on optimising each 
activity. Moreover, the boundary between construction and manufacturing is not clear. 
For instance, there is confusion whether a supplier of standard off-the-shelf products 
such as pipes and tubes to a shipyard is part of the construction or the manufacturing 
industry (Segerstedt and Olofsson 2010).  
 
Nevertheless, lean philosophy focuses on improving the entire value stream, rather than 
individual processes and activities. The concept of lean construction has been 
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developed based on the principles of the Toyota production system, to tailor lean 
thinking to the peculiar characteristics of construction.  
2.3.2. Elements of construction 
There are particularly three essential elements of construction that differentiates 
construction from traditional manufacturing; (1) One-of-a-kind nature of projects, (2) 
site production and (3) temporary multi-organisations (Koskela 1992). However, 
Ballard and Howell (1998) argue that there are other types of production that possesses 
one or more of these characteristics, and therefore the uniqueness of a project is a 
relative matter. 
Similarly, Koskela (1992) emphasises to what extent construction is not unique, and 
suggests actions in order to reduce the uniqueness of construction projects such as using 
standardised work flows and components and modularisation.    
Nevertheless, a characteristic that clearly differentiates construction from traditional 
manufacturing is the “fixed-position manufacturing” characteristic. Fixed-position 
manufacturing means that the manufactured products become too large to be moved 
through work stations, so that the work stations have to be moved through the product 
(Ballard and Howell 1998).  
The Lean Construction Institute (LCI) summarises lean construction as a “production 
management based project delivery system emphasizing the reliable and speedy 
delivery of value. It challenges the generally accepted belief that there is always a trade 
between time, cost and quality”(LCI 2012).  
Similarly, Ballard and Howell (2004, 2) put forward that lean construction “conceives a 
construction project as a temporary production system dedicated to the three goals of 
delivering the product while maximising value and minimising waste”. 
 
Koskela (1992, 16) has elaborated eleven principles from lean thinking which are 
applicable to lean construction: 
1) Reduce share of non-value adding activities. 
2) Increase output value through systematic consideration of customer 
requirements.  
There are two types of customers for each activity; the next activity and the final 
customer, and value is generated by fulfilling customer requirements.  
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3) Reduce variability. 
There are two reasons for reducing process variability: First, any deviation from 
target value causes a loss of value to customer, and second, variability increases the 
volume of non-value adding activities.  
4) Reduce the cycle time.  
Benefits of reduced cycle time include faster delivery to customers, reduced need to 
forecast future demand and decreased disruptions due to change orders.  
5) Simplifying by minimising the number of steps and parts. 
The construction process can be simplified by reducing the number of components 
in a product and reducing the number of steps in a material and information flow. 
6) Increase output flexibility. 
Increased flexibility can be realised by modularised product design, reduce 
difficulty of setups and changeovers and training a multi- skilled workforce. 
7) Increase process transparency. 
Make the production process transparent and observable to facilitate for control and 
improvement to all the employees. 
8) Focus control on the complete process. 
Avoid sub- optimisation and optimise the total workflow by engaging in long- term 
co-operation with suppliers and by letting self-directed teams control their 
processes.   
9) Build continuous improvement into the process. 
The effort to reduce waste and increase the value in the construction process must 
be carried out on a continuous basis.  
10) Balance flow improvements with conversion improvement.  
Both the flows and conversions have to be addressed. The potential for flow 
improvement is normally higher than conversion improvement and require lower 
investments, but flow improvements takes longer time to implement compared to 
conversion improvements. 
11) Benchmark  
Includes knowing the organisation’s strength, weaknesses, threats and opportunities, 
knowing the industry leaders and competitors and create a competitive advantage by 
combining existing strengths with external best practices (Koskela 1992).   
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He argue that most of these principles address the elimination of non-value adding 
activities, but points out “it is also possible to directly attack the most visible waste just 
by flowcharting the process, then pinpointing and measuring non-value adding 
activities” (Koskela 2000, p. 58). 
 
Ballard and Howell (1998) argue that the lean revolution is essentially a conceptual 
revolution, as the focus has shifted from solely to be on the conversion process, to also 
include the flow and value processes. They put forward that implementing lean in 
construction has two parts; (1) Minimising uniqueness of construction to take advantage 
of lean techniques developed in manufacturing, and (2) develop lean techniques suitable 
for dynamic construction.  
Furthermore, they point to that implementing lean in construction projects does not 
imply making construction manufacturing by standardising products or using lean tools 
explicitly. Instead, implementing lean means developing standard procedures to plan 
and manage construction projects, thus adopting a “project-as-production-system” 
approach to construction, while understanding the principles offered by lean, to 
maximise value and minimise waste (Ballard and Howell 1998).   
 
On the other hand, Jørgensen and Emmitt (2008) argue that many lean construction 
publications are not built on solid theoretical ground because the management books on 
which these publications are based on do not refer to scientific research methods for 
validating the results. The lack of empirical evidence within the field of lean 
construction is therefore a weakness of lean construction concept. In addition, they 
point to the lack of a common definition of the concept of lean construction as a 
weakness of lean construction (Jørgensen and Emmitt 2008).  
2.3.2.1. Traditional construction vs. Lean construction  
 
Ballard and Howell (2004) suggests that there are four roots of the emergence of Lean 
construction as a new approach to construction projects; the success of the TPS, 
dissatisfaction with project performance, efforts to establish a theoretical background to 
project management and the failure of traditional thinking and practice to explain facts. 
The method of managing construction projects based on lean principles is 
fundamentally different from the traditional approach to managing construction 
projects. The most fundamental difference between lean and traditional constriction is 
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related to scheduling. While lean construction is based on a pull work schedule, 
traditional construction uses a push work schedule. This is a clear difference, as a pull 
system schedule work based on actual downstream demand, while a push system 
schedule work based on system status (Ballard and Howell 2004).  
 
Production processes can be viewed in three different ways; (1) a process of converting 
inputs to outputs, (2) as a flow of materials and information through time and space and 
(3) as a process of generating value to the end customer. However, while the process of 
converting inputs to outputs has been dominating view in the construction industry until 
very recently, the flow concept is applicable to construction industries because 
production in construction is of assembly-type, where different material flows are 
connected to the end product (Koskela 2000; Ballard and Howell 2004). 
In particular, the flow principle is important in lean construction because it focuses on 
eliminating non-value adding activities, to ensure a continuous flow of value adding 
activities (Koskela 2000).   
2.4. Lean shipbuilding 
This section will outline the concept of lean shipbuilding, which is a concept tailoring 
lean thinking to shipbuilding. First, however, the characteristics of shipbuilding will be 
outlined, with a particular focus on the Norwegian shipbuilding industry. Following 
this, the concept of lean shipbuilding will be described and the applicability of lean 
thinking to Norwegian shipbuilding will be discussed.   
2.4.1. Shipbuilding  
The characteristics of shipbuilding vary across countries and sectors, usually due to the 
degree of complexity and the level of customisation of the ships. For instance, 
shipbuilding in Norway is recognised by a high level of complexity. The characteristics 
below are highly relevant for the Norwegian shipbuilding industry, and can also be, 
particularly consistent production facilities and fixed position manufacturing, related to 
shipbuilding in other countries (Dugnas and Oterhals 2008; Liker and Lamb 2002; 
Aslesen and Bertelsen 2008; Longva 2009): 
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 One-of-a-kind production 
Ships are engineered-to-order products, with typically significant differences in 
designs and specifications between different ships. Although some small series of 
ships may occur, each ship is customised to the owner’s specific requirements. 
However, shipbuilding is similar to mass production in terms of repeatable 
standardised processes such as welding and production line for pipe fabrication. 
 Consistent production facilities 
In contrast to construction, each shipbuilding project takes places within the same 
production facilities at the shipyards. The established production infrastructure also 
ensures a higher degree of repetitiveness in the flow of materials, compared to 
traditional construction.  
 Fixed position manufacturing 
Shipbuilding is in similar fashion to construction characterised by fixed position 
manufacturing, as the ships are too complex to move around, with workstations 
moving through the ship.  
 Temporary organisations 
Due to the project driven nature of the shipbuilding industry, temporary 
organisations are created to manage specific projects. There is, however, less 
randomness in shipbuilding projects’ organisation compared to construction. 
 
Dugnas and Oterhals (2008) points out additional characteristics that differentiate 
Norwegian shipbuilding industry from traditional construction industries. These are 
outlined below. 
 Design, SCM and production activities are integrated and carried out 
simultaneously – it is rather a rule than an exception. 
 Significant prefabrication and pre-outfitting of units and modules off-site. 
 Advantage of supply network within the Norwegian Maritime Cluster. 
 Significant customisation and innovation- also during construction phase (it is 
common with change orders). 
 
In addition, the industry is cyclical industry highly volatile with the economic climate. 
In economic booms, the industry is typically capacity constrained (critical lead times 
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and lack of workforce), while in recessions the industry has typically excess capacity 
(Dugnas and Oterhals 2008; Hervik et al. 2009).  
 
There are typically four key production phases in the Norwegian shipbuilding industry; 
(1) Hull fabrication, (2) Primary outfitting, (3) Final outfitting and (4) Testing. The two 
first phases are normally outsourced to shipyards in low-cost countries, while the final 
outfitting and testing is performed at the shipyards’ facilities (Dugnas and Oterhals 
2008). 
Furthermore, the shipyards rely on a complex network of suppliers of components, with 
an increasing part of the production being performed by trade contractors. It is therefore 
clear that shipbuilding is a highly complex, multi-phase and multi-actor process 
including several different operating, several disciplines and a wide range of suppliers. 
This makes the shipbuilding process similar to the construction process (Aslesen and 
Bertelsen 2008). Consequently, as lean principles are already being widely applied to 
construction industries, it can be argued that lean principles are also applicable to the 
shipbuilding industry. This will be discussed in the next section.  
2.4.2. Application of lean principles to shipbuilding 
As a result of the characteristics of the shipbuilding industry, Dugnas and Oterhals 
(2008) argue that shipbuilding can be treated similarly to construction with regards to 
transferring lean principles to shipbuilding. Furthermore, they point to how the  
characteristics described above serves as a background for analysis to define how lean 
principles can be applied to shipbuilding.  
In similar fashion, Liker and Lamb (2000) argue that lean thinking is applicable to 
shipbuilding due to particularly two points. First, the basic principle of giving 
customers what they want with shortened lead times and less waste applies to any 
industry. Secondly, they point to leading shipbuilding models which have much of the 
same underlying philosophy as the TPS at work in building ships. Particularly, they 
point to Japanese shipyards that use modular designs, highly standardised processes and 
JIT deliveries of raw materials. In addition, Liker and Lamb (2002) point to be process 
of continuous improvement as being applicable to any process.  
 
Nevertheless, even though shipbuilding can resemble construction in some areas, it is 
clear that shipbuilding differs from construction. Therefore, it should be emphasised 
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that application of lean principles to shipbuilding in Norway is not about copying lean 
tools and techniques from lean manufacturing or lean construction (or lean shipbuilding 
in Japan), but rather developing own tools and techniques tailored to the specific needs, 
including strategy, organisational culture and facility layout, of the shipyards aiming to 
apply lean principles (Dugnas and Oterhals 2008).  
2.5. Supply chain management 
In this section the origins of supply chain management (SCM) will be outlined, SCM 
will be defined and the concepts of SCM will be described. Furthermore, this section 
will describe construction SCM and typical waste in construction supply chains. Lastly, 
this section will discuss how the SCM concept relates to the shipbuilding industry. 
2.5.1. Origins and definitions 
The term supply chain management (SCM) first emerged in the literature in the mid- 
1980’s. However, the concepts which SCM is based on are significantly older, and 
include managing inter-organisational operations, systems integration research and 
information sharing (Cooper, Lambert, and Pagh 1997).   
Similarly, Vrijhoef and Koskela (2000) point to how SCM emerged from 
manufacturing industries, particularly the JIT delivery system of the TPS, which aimed 
to regulate supplies to the Toyota factory in the right amount, right time and right place. 
In addition, they point to the work of Deming (1982), who argued that working with 
suppliers in a long-term relationship of trust and loyalty would improve the quality and 
reduce the cost of production (Vrijhoef and Koskela 2000).  
Furthermore, Mentzer et al. (2001) point to the influence of Forrester (1958) and how 
his identification of key management issues such as interrelationships between different 
functions within a company and between different companies, are referred to within the 
concept of SCM.  
Mentzer et al. (2001, 4) define a supply chain as “as a set of three or more entities 
(organisations or individuals) directly involved in the upstream and downstream flows 
of products, services, finances and/or information from a source to a customer”. They 
point to how different authors define SCM either in operational terms involving the 
flow of materials and products, as a management philosophy or in terms of a 
management process (Mentzer et al. 2001).  
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There are many different definitions of SCM. In this thesis, however, the definition of 
SCM from the Global Supply Chain Forum (GSCF) will be used. They define SCM as 
(Lambert and Cooper 2000, 66): 
“Supply Chain Management is the integration of key business processes 
from end user through original suppliers that provides products, 
services, and information that add value for customers and other 
stakeholders.” 
Other stakeholders in this definition relate to other involved parties in the supply chain 
such as suppliers and the focal firm. In this respect, an important aspect of SCM is to 
create value for all involved parties within the supply chain, with a focus on satisfying 
end-customers’ needs through collaboration and coordination.  Furthermore, it views 
supply chains  as an integrated value-generating flow rather than a set of independent 
activities.  
In contrast, the traditional way of managing the supply chain focuses on the conversion 
view of production. The waste arising from supply chains which are not integrated or 
streamlined include unnecessary variability, excessive inventory and lack of control 
(Lambert and Cooper 2000).  
2.5.2. Concepts 
Building on the previous section, this section will describe the concepts of supply chain 
lead time, the two flows in a supply chain; materials and information, the four supply 
chain structures, make-to-stock, make-to-order, assemble-to-order and engineer-to-
order and ABC-classification of components.  
2.5.2.1. Supply chain lead time 
The supply chain lead time is the time required for a material to flow through the 
processes and activities in the supply chain, from origin to end-customer.  
The lead time depends on various factors such as the complexity of the products 
(Arbulu and Tommelein 2002). Koskela (2000, 58) argue that supply chain lead time is 
comprised by four elements; (1) processing time, (2) inspection time, (3) wait time and 
(4) move time. He argues that only the processing time adds value to the end- product, 
while the other elements are non-value adding activities.  
Furthermore, Koskela (2000, 60) put forward that benefits of compressing the lead time 
are: 
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 Faster delivery of the product or service to the customer 
 Reduced need to forecast future demand 
 Decrease of disruption of the production process due to change orders 
 Easier management because there are fewer customer orders to keep track of 
 
2.5.2.2. Flow of materials and information  
Within a supply chain there are three flows; material, information and capital. However, 
for this thesis only the material and information flows are considered. 
Material flow refers to the flow of physical goods from origin through the processes and 
activities in the supply chain to the end-customer as a final product, while information 
flow refers to the flow of information between the involved parties in a supply chain 
(Harrison and Hoek 2008). Figure 2 illustrates a generic supply chain in manufacturing 
where materials flow downstream in the supply chain, while information flows 
upstream.  
 
   
Figure 2: Generic configuration of a supply chain (Vrijhoef and Koskela 2000) 
2.5.2.3. Supply chain structures 
There are mainly four supply chain structures (in some form or another) for a supply 
chain; make-to-stock, make-to-order, assembly-to-order and engineer-to-order. One 
important element related to the supply chain can structures is the customer order 
decoupling point (CODP). The CODP is a stock holding point that separates the part of 
a supply chain that responds directly to the customer from the part of the supply chain 
that uses forecast planning (Gosling and Naim 2009). The four supply chain structures 
are described below (Gosling and Naim 2009; van Weele 2010).  
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 Make-to-stock (MTS) 
Make-to-stock production is characterised by standard products being manufactured 
and stocked, with customers being serviced from an end product inventory. The 
decoupling point is located as finished goods at the supplier. 
 
 Make-to-order (MTO) 
Products are manufactured from raw materials or components inventory after an 
order from a customer has been received and accepted. The decoupling point is 
located at purchased goods.  
 
 Assembly-to-order (ATO) 
Only systems elements and subassemblies are in stock at the manufacturing centre 
and final assembly takes place based on a specific customer order. The decoupling 
point is located at finished goods in a supply centre. 
 
 Engineer-to-order (ETO) 
All the production activities from design to assembly and even purchasing of 
required materials are related to a specific customer order. The decoupling point is 
located at the design stage. 
 
2.5.2.4. ABC- classification of components  
A traditional method for classifying component or inventory is an ABC classification 
system, where components are classified as either A, B or C components (Arnold, 
Chapman, and Clive 2008; Ramakrishnan 2006).  
 
 A-components  
A-components are strategically important components, which counts for a small 
number of total quantities, but a large proportion of total value. In a project 
environment, A- components are typically ETO. 
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 B- components 
B-components can be categorised between A and C components, in terms of both 
unit value and quantities required. In a project environment, B-components are 
typically MTO non-strategic, but project specific items.  
 C- Components  
C-components are “bits and pieces” or consumables, which counts for a large 
number of total quantities, but a small proportion of total value. In a project 
environment, C- components are typically MTS non-project specific components.  
2.5.3. Supply chain management in construction 
As discussed above, construction industries differ from traditional manufacturing. 
Consequently, construction supply chains have to be managed differently compared to 
manufacturing industries. According to Vrijhoef and Koskela (2000, 3), a construction 
supply chain in terms of structure and function can be characterised by three elements: 
 
 It is a converging supply chain directing all materials to the construction site where 
the object is assembled from incoming materials. The construction site is set up 
around one single product. 
 It is, usually, a temporary supply chain producing one-off construction projects 
through repeated reconfiguration of project organisations. It is therefore recognised 
by instability, fragmentation and particularly separation between design and 
construction.  
 It is a typical make-to-order supply chain, with every project creating a new product 
or prototype. Although there is usually little repetition, the processes can be very 
similar for projects of a particular kind.  
 
As a response to these characteristics, Vrijhoef and Koskela (2000) have proposed that 
SCM has four specific roles in construction. The four roles are described below and 
illustrated in figure 3. 
 Role 1: Focus on the interface between the supply chain and the construction 
site 
The focus is on improving the flow of materials to the construction site through 
cooperation with suppliers.  
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 Role 2: Focus on the supply chain 
This includes developing specific supply chain by considering a trade-off between 
transportation, inventory and production costs.  
 Role 3: Focus on transferring activities from the construction site to the supply 
chain 
This role focuses on transferring on-site activities off the construction site, by for 
instance prefabrication or modularisation, to reduce on-site activities. 
 Role 4: Focus on the integrated management of the supply chain and the 
construction site 
The goal is to replace the usually temporary chains with permanent supply chains, 
through for instance standardising procedures and activities.  
 
 
Figure 3: The four roles of SCM in construction (Vrijhoef and Koskela 2000). 
 
Hamzeh et al. (2007) propose that the construction industry is characterised by high 
variations in supply and demand for resources such as material, equipment and services. 
The uncertainty causes inefficiencies and unresponsiveness within a supply chain with 
the result of supply-demand mismatches leading to increased lead time, poor utilisation 
of resources, increased supply chains costs and unsatisfied customers.  
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Along the same lines, Cox and Ireland (2002) suggest that construction supply chains 
are contested, fragmented and highly adversarial due to the conflicting nature of 
demand and supply. This has resulted in complicated structures of power between 
actors at each state of the supply chains (Cox and Ireland 2002).  
 
Moreover, Ireland (2004) put forward that construction supply chains are often 
characterised by adversarial and opportunistic actors. In contrast to researches who 
propose a SCM approach of cooperation and partnerships between supply chain actors 
in response to this (for instance DETR (1998) and Vrijhoef and Koskela (2000)) he 
argue that such SCM approaches can only be implemented in certain power regime 
circumstances. In his paper, he concludes that SCM approaches are only possible in 
construction supply chains with power regimes with extended buyer-dominance or 
buyer-supplier interdependence. In addition, the regularity of demand is a significant 
variable determining whether proactive SCM approaches can be applied or not (Ireland 
2004).  
2.5.4. Waste in construction supply chains 
Zimmer et al. (2008) put forward that most of the effort in implementing lean in 
construction has focused on field operations, while lean focuses on the entire value 
stream. Therefore, they argue that waste is still evident in the supply chain. Particularly, 
members of the supply chain often aim to maximise their own profit, while ignoring the 
effect on downstream members of the supply chain, which leads to waste in terms of 
ineffective supplier relations and transactions. Furthermore, they state (Zimmer et al. 
2008, 382):  
“These inefficient supply chains, along with incorrect design information, 
are bottlenecks which are inhibiting flow in the construction process, 
causing a “road block” for further value generation.” 
Vrijhoef and Koskela (1999) conducted three case studies on construction supply chains 
to give insight to the waste and problems in these supply chains, and the causes of these 
wastes and problems. Their findings showed that time buffers had a large impact on the 
total lead time. The underlying cause of time buffers was separate planning in the 
supply chain due to inter-organisational barriers.   
Furthermore, they drew three main conclusions from their case studies; (1) Waste and 
problems exist, even in normal situations, but this is not seen or ignored, with each actor 
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focusing on its own business, (2) the root cause of the waste is usually not found in the 
activity the waste is encountered, but in an earlier activity performed by another actor, 
often at a higher organisational level and (3) waste is caused by myopic control in the 
supply chain, with each actor optimising its own activity without considering the impact 
of downstream activities in the supply chain. The result is that a low proportion of the 
total lead time is value-adding time, while the majority of the total lead time is wasted 
time (Vrijhoef and Koskela 1999). 
 
In their research on pipe supports, Arbulu and Tommelein (2002) found that causes of 
waste in the supply chain are mainly related to the time materials and information are 
waiting to be processed. Particularly, they point to the batching effect as a cause of 
waiting time. In their case, they put forward two examples of the batching effect. (1) 
Design information is sent from engineers to supplier in large batches, and (2) the 
completed materials are shipped in large batches from the supplier to the construction 
site. In addition, waste is often occurring on the interface between activities, processes 
or organisations.  
Polat and Ballard (2003) evaluated the supply chains of cut and bent rebar for Turkish 
construction projects. Their results showed that wasted time amounted to up to three 
quarters of the total lead time. The main causes of this wasted time were inaccurate data 
transfers, lack of coordination between supply chain partners, lack of data format 
standardisation, infrequent deliveries due to high cost of shipping and priority changes. 
They concluded that these causes often resulted in interrupted materials and information 
flows. 
Additionally, the material flow in a construction project is considered of major 
importance because project delays are often caused by lack of materials (Elfving, 
Tommelein, and Ballard 2004). 
2.5.5. Supply chain management in shipbuilding 
As outlined above, the Norwegian shipbuilding industry can be identified as ETO, 
where each ship being design and engineered one-of-a-kind, with rare exceptions where 
two identical “sister” ships are built. Mello and Strandhagen (2011) point to other 
characteristics of ETO operations, including high level of customisation, different 
components are required in different volumes and some components are highly 
customised while others are standardised.  
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Further, they point to how Norwegian shipbuilding also have some of the features of 
MTO operations, such as fluctuating demand cycles, project-specific components 
demands and uncertain production conditions.  
Due to the complexity, multi-phased and multi-actor setup of the Norwegian  
shipbuilding industry, Aslesen and Bertelsen (2008) emphasise the importance of 
managing the coordination of multiple parties in the supply chains, particularly as each 
party can be expected to pursue its own agenda.  
Similarly, Mello and Strandhagen (2011) discuss that a critical issue for SCM in 
shipbuilding is to efficiently integrate and coordinate the network of suppliers, 
subcontractors and shipyard resources. Moreover, they point to how attempts to 
developing collaborative relationships in a shipbuilding setting often are filled with 
frustration with the lack of trust, and that the lack of trust can be a result of adversarial 
relationship, low-volume and infrequent demand for many items and a price-
competitive procurement approach,  
Correspondingly, Dugnas and Uthaug (2007) found that shipyards report a significant 
stronger relationship with the suppliers than vice versa. They suggest that this can 
mirror the satisfaction with the relationship, where the shipyards are very satisfied with 
the supply conditions, while the suppliers feel they have no influence, and due to the 
frequent sourcing from the shipyards making the demand for new orders uncertain and 
variable for the suppliers.  
In addition, they point to how some equipment now is procured directly from ship 
owners and how the development of a few large suppliers for the shipyards have 
changed the role of smaller suppliers to the shipyard.  
 
Following in the lines of Vrijhoef and Koskela, it is clear that the supply chain of a 
Norwegian shipyard is a converging supply chain directing the materials to the 
construction site. In contrast to other construction projects, such as construction of 
buildings, shipbuilding is recognised by fixed production site, i.e. the shipyard. 
Consequently, it can be argued that supply chains for Norwegian shipyards are to a 
lesser degree characterised by temporary supply chains if compared to other 
construction projects. This is particularly because the materials are flowing to the same 
location for each project.  The supply chains are, however, temporary in terms of the 
partners involved in the supply chains for each project and the amount and type of 
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materials and information flowing in the supply chain, as these may differ depending on 
each project.  
In addition, the supply chain for a Norwegian shipyard is also characterised by different 
partners in the supply chain have different supply chain structures for their upstream 
supply chain. For instance, a supplier of standard components may produce and manage 
its upstream suppliers based on a MTS or MTO supply chain structure. One issue for 
the management of shipbuilding supply chains is therefore how to integrate suppliers 
with a MTS/MTO supply chain structure into the ETO shipbuilding project. This issue 
of MTS and MTO components in a project environment will be discussed below, and 
compared to ETO components in a project environment.  
2.5.5.1. B and C components in project environment 
As described above, B and C components have in a project environment typically a 
MTO or MTS upstream supply chain structure. 
Although B and C components are different in a theoretical perspective, no clear 
difference between these components with respect to the external flow of materials to 
the shipyard will be made in this thesis. This is because GS-Hydro, in contrast to 
Ulstein who view this as two different types of components (B and C), view these as 
similar components mainly supplied from their inventory, and are thus handled 
similarly by GS-Hydro, with the same lead time. 
In terms of the internal flow after Ulstein receive the goods, the components are viewed 
and treated differently, particularly with respect to project specificity.  
Nevertheless, in this thesis both B and C components are considered as standardised 
components with relatively low unit value, high volumes per project and short lead 
time. The main difference is how Ulstein classify B components as project specific 
items, and C components as consumables (non-project specific items).  
 
Sanderson and Cox (2008) studied a supply chain delivering electrical cables, which are 
standard components, typically MTS or MTO, to a major UK shipbuilder. They argue 
that in a one-off or low-volume project environment, where there are typically 
significant differences in design and specifications between different ships, it is almost 
impossible to predict the parameters of demand (type, quantity and timing) based on 
past experience. They concluded that electrical cables used in shipbuilding have both 
features of a functional and innovative product. Most interestingly, however, is how a 
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supply chain of standard components such as electrical cables have the features of 
innovative products. These features are unpredictable demand pattern and a high margin 
in forecasting requirements. This is a result of building of the ship commences before 
the design is completed, and thus both the design and build schedule of a vessel are 
subject to on-going change (Sanderson and Cox 2008).  
Furthermore, Sanderson and Cox (2008) discuss how the mixed characteristics of end 
customer demand is visible for standard components such as electric cables, with the 
demand is highly volatile and unpredictable, while the end customer is also price 
sensitive.  
Tommelein et al. (2008) propose that finished goods inventory have zero lead time, and 
thus components can be shipped quickly to customers as well as it serves as a 
protection, or buffer, against uncertainties of customer demand. In addition, finished 
goods inventory allows for batch optimising, thus lowering the shipping and handling 
costs.  
Although finished goods inventory can compensate for the lack of information and 
predictability of demand in one-of-a-kind construction projects, it disregards a holistic 
value chain perspective, important in both SCM and lean thinking. The lack of demand 
information also requires the supplier to hold a large product assortment at finished 
goods inventory, in order to maintain a high service level, thus creating waste in terms 
of excessive inventory.  
However, in a project environment (such as Norwegian shipbuilding) some B (MTO) 
components have a long manufacturing lead time from manufacturer (second tier 
supplier), thus finished goods inventory at the first tier supplier can be seen as an 
important link between manufacturer and the construction site.   
A further issue in this respect is whether the supplier should have one central warehouse 
serving all customers directly or several regional warehouses within a specific 
geographical area (for this thesis, say Norway).  
Warehouses have particularly three roles within a distribution system; transportation 
consolidation, product mixing and service, and the aim is to provide the highest 
possible service at lowest possible cost (Arnold, Chapman, and Clive 2008). 
It is generally considered that by adding more warehouses inventory and material 
handling will increase, while transportation costs decrease if the regional warehouses 
are replenished directly from a supplier (Arnold, Chapman, and Clive 2008). However, 
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if the regional warehouses have to be replenished from a central warehouse, it seems 
likely that transportation costs will increase as well.  
On the other hand, the service level have to be considered and a regional warehouse has 
the advantage of being closer to the market, thus being able to serve the customer with a 
shorter lead time compared to a central warehouse. With respect to the location and 
number of warehouses there is therefore an important trade-off between cost and 
service level (Arnold, Chapman, and Clive 2008).  
 
Although finished goods inventory in itself can disregard a holistic value chain 
perspective, in a Norwegian shipbuilding context it can be considered important as a 
link between the manufacturer and the shipyard and as a buffer protecting against 
uncertain demand. An important issue is still, however, to minimise excessive 
inventory, material handling and transportation to obtain a streamlined flow between a 
MTS supplier and an ETO project.  
Arbulo et al. (2003) put forward how kanban can be utilised in construction supply 
chains, both to manage the on-site material flow and as a means to integrate MTS 
suppliers to a ETO project. A similar approach was suggested by Arbulo et al. (2005).  
This will be described in more detail later.  
2.5.5.2. A-components in project environment 
In terms of strategic components, ETO, these are recognised by high unit value, low 
volume and long lead time as customer orders are processed through engineering, 
detailing, fabrication and delivery, hence classified as A-components in a project 
environment. 
The long lead time in combination with high uncertainty and variability in construction 
projects, can result in many design decisions having to be made early in the process, 
based on weak assumptions. This may again lead to suboptimal solutions, quality 
defects and rework. Consequently, compression the lead time in the delivery process of 
strategic components can have major impact on the project performance (Elfving, 
Tommelein, and Ballard 2002).  
In a study on the delivery process of ETO products,  Elfving et al. (2004) found several 
causes that increased the delivery lead time. In the design phase the causes included 
changes due to design errors, low level of design standardisation and non-sequenced 
“push” driven design, while causes in the procurement phase included serial 
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competitive bidding, large document batches and changes in product specifications. The 
component lead time and capacity constraints were the main causes of delays in the 
manufacturing phase.   
Similarly, in an earlier study, the same authors described the information flow in the 
supply chain for ETO components as often being fragmented, complex and uncertain, 
while the material flow is often characterised by frequent change orders and long lead 
times. Particularly they point to the supply chain partners’ lack of system perspective, 
as well as a lack of an overall coordination mechanism as major sources of delays and 
long lead times in the supply chain because it generates a lot of unnecessary work 
(Elfving, Tommelein, and Ballard 2002). They point to a vicious circle, where longer 
manufacturing lead times cause more engineering uncertainty and more engineering 
uncertainty causes more waste in the delivery process which again leads to longer lead 
times (Elfving, Tommelein, and Ballard 2002).  
Accordingly, Forsman et al. (2011) studied the delivery process of a ETO component 
from a system perspective. Their findings suggest that improvements in construction 
supply chains are hindered by the partners’ lack of a system view. Particularly they 
point to the fragmented information flow is a result of information needs are not met, 
lack of competence and lack of standardisation of the interface between the supplier and 
the customer. They therefore put forward a more standardised interface between the 
customer and the supplier as a solution to improve the information flow in the value 
chain. 
Correspondingly, Azambuja and Formoso (2003) propose that most of the problems 
occur on the interface between parties in the supply chain, due to the ineffective 
information flows, lack of cooperation and poor coordination of the supply chain 
members. Particularly, they point to the lack of planning in the flow of materials 
between the supplier and the on-site activities as a major source of waste on-site in 
terms of inventories and unproductive workers. In addition, they emphasise the 
importance of correct positioning of large ETO components before installation, because 
poor position may affect the execution of other activities. As a result, they suggest a 
more formal planning to coordinate the flow of materials, as well as greater integration 
between suppliers and construction site (Azambuja and Formoso 2003).  
Furthermore, Elfving et al. (2003) specifically question the true value of procuring 
power distribution equipment (ETO components) through competitive bidding. Their 
findings indicate that competitive bidding have a negative impact on delivery and 
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labour time. In terms of delivery time the impact was 2-3 months, while in terms of 
labour time they estimated that the cost of the bidding practice in itself amounted to 10 
per cent of the value of the component. Particularly, they point to how competitive 
bidding increases fragmentation of the process and reinforces adverse goals, which 
leads to local optimisation rather than systems (or supply chain) optimisation.  
In addition, they point to how document batch sizes have a major impact on the process 
lead time, and thus the largest lead time reduction in the delivery process of ETO 
components can be realised by reducing the document batch size and need for 
approvals. Interestingly, they conclude that the largest opportunity for reducing ETO 
lead time lies with improved document flow and not in reduction manufacturing lead 
time.  
In addition, in a Norwegian shipbuilding context, the final decision with respect to 
selection of suppliers for strategic components is made by the client/ship owner, thus 
further complicating the competitive bidding process and information flow for ETO 
components.  
2.5.5.3. Comparison of MTS, MTO and ETO  
Tommelein et al. (2008) suggest that there are two types of construction supply chains. 
First, a construction supply chain may be part of existing, longer-lived supply chains 
that operate regardless of whether or not any specific projects exist. Second, a 
construction supply chain may be established for the purpose to meet one project’s or 
several projects’ needs.  
In a Norwegian shipbuilding context, one can argue that MTS and MTO components 
belong to the first type of construction supply chains. This is due to that shipbuilding is 
fixed-site production, and normally there is at least one ship being built, thus there is a 
constant need for standard components, with each type of components, such as pipes, 
often being supplied from a limited number of suppliers.  
By comparison, it can be argued that ETO components in a Norwegian shipbuilding 
context belong to the second type of construction supply chains. The reason for this is 
the low volume of components required for each project, as well as each type of 
components, such as thrusters, is not necessarily procured from the same supplier for 
each project.  
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Nevertheless, due to the fixed-position and that at least one ship is normally being built, 
the internal flow of materials is permanent, regardless of type of components and 
supplier. 
Furthermore, Wegelius-Lehtonen and Pahkala (1998) suggest that even though products 
and components are different from project to project, the information and material 
delivery processes are almost the same in every construction project. They point to how 
material flows are most important for standard components, while information flows are 
most important for ETO components. In terms of material flows, they argue that the 
logistics costs as a percentage of the purchase price of standard components are higher 
compared to ETO components. 
2.5.5.4. Internal logistics  
Previously, during the first Lean shipbuilding in Norway research program, the concept 
of project logistics was used to describe the flow of parts and components within the 
shipyard (Dugnas and Oterhals 2008). Currently, however, within the Lean 
Shipbuilding II research program, the concept has been broadened to also cover external 
value streams, and thus the concept is currently used to describe all the flows of 
materials related to a specific project. 
 
Nevertheless, the flow of components and parts within the shipyard is still an important 
aspect of SCM in shipbuilding and current meaning of project logistics. In this thesis, 
this flow of materials will be referred to as the internal flow of materials.  
In a study on warehouse management at Ulstein, Longva (2009) discusses how the 
material flow at shipyards is characterised by limited space for storing materials at the 
work site. The use of time buffers when setting delivery dates for strategic components 
to reduce the risk of late deliveries increases the requirements for storage space further. 
Additionally, the different requirements in terms of materials, equipment and suppliers 
for different projects results in reduced possibilities to standardise materials and engage 
in closer cooperation with suppliers (Longva 2009). On the other hand, as outlined 
above, due to the fixed position and that there is usually at least one ship being built, 
shipyards can utilise the same infrastructure for material handling for all projects. As a 
result, it can be argued that shipyards have the possibility of standardising the internal 
flow of materials, at least to a certain degree.   
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Furthermore, because of the limited space available in the vessel and the insufficient 
coordination of deliveries and production, the warehouse function is a focal point in the 
shipyard because it serves as a buffer between suppliers and production to ensure timely 
deliveries of materials into production (Longva 2009).  
 
2.6. Lean supply chain management in construction  
Supply chain management is the traditional term for managing supply chains, and the 
concept of lean supply chain management arises when fundamental lean principles such 
as continuous flow and pull are included (Zimmer et al. 2008). Similarly, Wincel (2004) 
argue that the concepts of Lean and SCM intersect in terms of profitability and quality 
objectives as well as customer satisfaction.  
 
Furthermore, Lamming  (1996) argues that in contrast to traditional supply chain 
management, where the focus is on managing relationships with suppliers and 
customers, in lean supply the entire flow from raw materials to end-customer is 
considered as an integrated whole. Therefore, the traditional interfaces between 
companies are seen as artificial, only created as a result of the economic arrangements 
of assets. A fundamental principle of lean supply is that waste in one activity is not 
limited to that activity, but impacts the whole supply chain. Lamming (1996, 5) states:  
 
“This is a fundamental point, since lean supply does not recognise the 
traditional positions of customer and supplier, which tend to obscure 
the central quest for the removal of waste.” 
 
The purpose of lean SCM in construction is to accomplish supply management with 
minimal amounts of waste in construction projects.  The focus is on developing 
relationships among the partners in the supply chain. Through coordination and 
collaboration the aim is to improve the total flow of materials in a construction project.  
 
The rest of this section will describe and discuss elements considered important in order 
to achieve lean supply chain management in construction and shipbuilding.  
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2.6.1. Pulling to site demand and JIT 
A central idea in implementing lean is to create a “pull” system. A pull driven approach 
means that materials are delivered when they are needed in the quantities needed 
(Tommelein 1998).  By comparison, a push driven approach relies on forecasts, where 
the materials are pushed downstream in the supply chain. This creates waste in terms of 
overproduction and excessive inventory. Through the establishment of pull in the 
supply chain these wastes can be reduced, and material can flow through all the 
activities in the supply chain without excessive inventory  (Tommelein, Ballard, and 
Kaminsky 2008). The most common term used in a pull system is Just-In-Time (JIT). 
In addition to the meaning of JIT that materials arrive in the right amount, at the right 
time, in the right place, it can also be described as the state in which value flow through 
the activities with minimum delays and waste (Kocakülâh, Brown, and Thomson 2008).  
In similar vein, Zimmer (2006) explains how the JIT aspect of lean construction 
involves delivering only what materials that are ready for installation, in the amounts 
needed, at the time needed, with the materials ideally are brought straight to the point of 
installation without interruptions such as storage or inspection.  
 
Arbulu, Ballard and Harper (2003) put forward a kanban strategy to manage materials 
on site and to the process of receiving, store, control and distribution of MTS products 
to assembly areas. Kanban in a lean approach to pull materials and parts through the 
value stream on a Just-in-time basis and there exist two types of Kanban: 1) Transport 
kanban which signals a need to replenish materials from suppliers and 2) Production 
kanban which initiates production (Arbulu, Ballard, and Harper 2003).  
2.6.2. Information sharing and collaboration  
Effective communication is essential to achieve a lean supply chain, as information 
must flow smoothly between organisations to optimise flow and generate value for end- 
customer (Zimmer 2006).   
Furthermore, Chen (2003) point out that the performance of a supply chain is dependent 
on how the actors coordinate their decisions, and argue that coordination is not possible 
without sharing of information.  
Simply put, the value of information is the resulting improvement of a supply chain’s 
performance after additional information is available to decision makers in the supply 
chain.  The element of information sharing is particularly complicated when the supply 
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chain consists of independent parties, because when one party has superior information 
he may either withhold the information to gain an advantage or share the information to 
improve cooperation (Chen 2003).  
 
Based on the work of Ian MacNeil, an advocate for relational contracting, several 
authors have discussed the relationship between lean construction and relational 
contracting (Ballard and Howell 2005; Matthews and Howell 2005; Colledge 2005). 
Colledge (2005) described how in a relational contracting agreement the contract 
assume less prominence than the relationship itself, and the mechanisms for delivery of 
a project focuses on trust and partnerships. The general agreement on the relationship 
between relational contracting and lean construction is that the traditional forms of 
contract (discrete, transactional) and the associated business structures do not facilitate 
the pursuit of the lean ideals. However, it is emphasised that substantial and long-
lasting improvements in project deliveries with enhanced value generation and/or waste 
reduction cannot solely be accomplished by changing contracts and incentives. 
Changing to relational contracting can instead facilitate the pursuit of the lean ideals, 
thus changing how the work is done (Ballard and Howell 2005). Figure 4 illustrates the 
relationship between type of contracts, project type and production systems.  
 
 
Figure 4: The spectrum of contract correlated with types of production systems and projects 
(Ballard and Howell 2005) 
Moreover, information flow can be considered as a means to integrate the supply chain 
by improving coordination and collaboration. From this view, the information flow can 
be improved by means of design and implementation of mechanism that ease the 
transparency and information sharing between the parties in the supply chain 
(Azambuja et al. 2006).  
 
In their research about commitments involved in the information sharing between 
supply chain partners, Azumbuja et al. (2006) argue that most causes of the inefficiency 
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in construction supply chains are caused by managerial issues, such as lack of 
integration of managerial processes and poor management of commitments among 
supply chain members. According to Denning and Medina- Mora (1995) the basic 
element of a coordination process is a closed loop that connects two parties; one of 
them (the performer) promise to satisfy a request from the other (the customer). This 
commitment loop is illustrated in figure 5.  
 
 
Figure 5: The commitment loop (Denning and Medina- Mora 1995) 
 
Azumbuja et al. (2006) identified four classes of failures to complete the commitment 
loops: 
 Lack, error or lateness in request formulation by the customer  
For instance, no explicit request was made from customer or the customer was not 
providing enough time for the completion of the task. 
 Lack of explicit declaration of commitment by the performer 
The performer does not make an explicit promise to fulfil the request. A promise 
should at least include what and when it is to be delivered.  
 Lack of explicit declaration of its conclusion by the performer 
The performer does not notify the customer that the task is completed.  
 Lack, error or lateness in declaration of customer’s satisfaction 
The commitment loops can only be closed when the customer explicitly expresses 
his satisfaction with the performance of the performer.  
 
53 
 
Based on their findings they conclude that a large part of the information flow problems 
in MTO supply chains can be traced back to poor management of commitment loops 
among people and firms. Finally, they point to how the possible solutions to 
information flow problems are not expensive, with many of the problems being 
avoidable by making supply chain members aware of the importance of managing 
commitments both within one organisation and between companies (Azambuja et al. 
2006). 
As a mechanism to improve the information flow, several authors have pointed to the 
use of information technology (IT) systems. Koskela (2000) point out how IT systems 
can help improve the delivery of a construction project and it can improve the 
communication between the actors in a construction project.  
Correspondingly, Zimmer (2006) argues how IT systems can be used to coordinate 
parties in the supply chain with real time information, which will also enable the use of 
transport kanban to send electronic signals to suppliers to replenish materials.   
 
Additionally, Pinho, Telhada and Carvalho (2007) emphasise the importance of reliable 
and real time information regarding needs of materials, equipment and workforce in 
construction projects. Consequently, they suggest the use of a web-based system where 
all actors in the supply chain can have access to relevant information through a common 
portal.  
 
Although not explicitly discussed by the authors, it can be argued that such a web-based 
portal is mainly applicable to MTS and MTO components due to the limited amount of 
specifications required. Suppliers can then get access to real time demand and 
indications for future demand, while the customers can get access to information such 
as availability of components and lead time.   
In comparison, due to the high level of specification and engineering, such a portal for 
ETO components would be more suitable for monitoring the suppliers’ progress to 
ensure on time delivery.  
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2.6.3. Planning delivery and material management 
The cost of material may add up to more than half of the total cost in a construction 
project. Consequently, the design and implementation of material management systems 
in construction projects is critical to obtain efficient construction projects, as poor 
management of materials may lead to delays and increased cost. Particularly, this delays 
and extra expenses may be incurred if; (1) materials required on site are not available 
when needed, (2) materials delivered on site are not the right materials or (3) large 
amounts of materials are accumulated on site (Arbulu, Koerckel, and Espana 2005).   
 
Thomas, Riley and Messner (2005, 808) define material management as: 
“The allocation of delivery, storage, and handling, spaces and resources 
for the purpose of supporting the labour force and minimising 
inefficiencies due to congestion and excess material movement”.  
 
It seems clear that good management of materials is related to how well deliveries and 
handling of materials are managed. Ideally, these should be controlled in the same 
fashion as site activities, and thus be planned and scheduled accordingly. Lack of 
planning and scheduling may have detrimental impacts on project performance, as out-
of-sequence deliveries of materials to site, double handling of materials, poor site layout 
and other sources of waste, may result in delays and increased costs of a construction 
project. 
Consequently, Arbulu, Koerckel and Espana  (2005) presented a systematic approach to 
link production level workflow with materials supply, illustrated in figure 6. They 
concluded that the management of supply can be incorporated into workflow 
management practices on site, by pulling materials to the site based on demand on a JIT 
basis. 
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Figure 6: Integrating production level workflow with materials supply (Arbulu, Koerckel, and 
Espana 2005) 
 
More specifically, they propose a particular approach of materials management of 
different supply chain structures:  
 
 MTS materials 
They suggest a method of physical control systems using kanban techniques, where 
replenishment points are driven by minimum and maximum levels of inventory.  
 MTO and ETO materials  
They suggest an approach of materials management systems to pull materials 
through the value stream with either appropriate work-in-progress levels in the 
supply chain (CONWIP) or each step in the supply chain (pure pull). These options 
are illustrated in figure 7. 
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Figure 7: Material management approaches for MTO and ETO materials (Arbulu, Koerckel, 
and Espana 2005) 
 
A similar approach to use kanban techniques to handle the delivery of MTS 
components is proposed by Arbulu et al. (2003). Particularly, they point to how kanban 
techniques can support the reduction of material inventories and paperwork required to 
procure components, as well as simplifying the site materials management of MTS 
components by eliminating waste and reducing information processing.  
 
Moreover, material planning includes quantifying, ordering and scheduling, and it is 
considered that material planning is particularly important in order to increase 
productivity and to ensure timely completion of projects. Therefore, a failure to 
properly plan the material supply is likely to result in lower productivity, with the 
consequence of failing to deliver a project on time (Kasim 2011).  
Thomas, Riley and Messner (2005) divide the storage of materials in a construction 
project into three areas, with according material management principles, also applicable 
to shipyards: 
1. Semi-permanent storage area 
These are the areas where materials are stored prior to being used in a project. For 
shipyards, this can relate to the warehouse, or other storage areas in the shipyard. 
Material management principles include marking stored materials and storing 
materials to facilitate easy access and retrieval. 
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2. Staging area 
These are the areas from where materials are lifted into the facility. Within 
shipyards, this can related to areas besides the dock. Material management 
principles include reserving the staging areas for material deliveries. 
3. Workface  
This is the area where the work takes place. For a shipyard, this relates to either on 
the ship or in the pre-fabrication areas. Material management principles include 
keeping materials stored at a minimum and preassembly of components. 
 
In addition, they point to principles for managing supplier relations and deliveries 
including sequencing deliveries with the work plan and aligning the delivery rate with 
actual work rate (Thomas, Riley, and Messner 2005).  
 
The Last Planner System is a widely adopted tool within lean construction, aimed at 
improving planning and controlling the production process. Consequently, linking the 
materials supply and management with the last planner system, should make it possible 
to improve the flow of material to a construction site. This is discussed by Ala-Risku 
and Kärkkäinen (2006) in their article Material delivery problems in construction 
projects: A possible solution. This will, along with the last planner system will be 
discussed in the next section. 
2.6.4. The Last Planner System  
As mentioned above, the last planner system is a tool to improve planning and control 
in the production process. After it was first introduced by Glenn Ballard in 1993 it has 
become one of the most important tools within the lean construction concept. The last 
planner system aims to create an even workflow by planning the weekly work and 
carefully monitoring the plan performance, and thus through proactive planning the 
work can flow across production units in the best achievable sequence and rate 
(Bertelsen 2002; Ballard 2000).  
Mossman (2005, 1) describes the last planner system as:  
“A system for collaboratively managing the network of relationships and 
conversations required for programme coordination, production planning 
and project delivery”.  
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Within the Last Planner system the aspects of pulling production, reducing variability 
and improving flow reliability are included, and the idea is to make the planning more 
realistic by allowing the last person in the process (the Last Planner) to plan and decide 
work tasks to be executed (Sterzi, Isatto, and Formoso 2007). Mossman (2005) argue 
how the last planner system creates conversations and decision making at the right 
levels of the of the project and at the right time to create trust among the last planner 
and higher project managers, by allowing the last planners to plan and decide work 
tasks.  
Koskela (2000) describes seven preconditions for the completion of a construction task. 
This has also been referred to as the MakeReady checklist by Mossman (2005, 2007). 
The seven preconditions, which Mossman call the seven flows, are: (1) Materials, (2) 
personnel, (3) information, (4) equipment (tools), (5) external conditions, (6) space and 
(7) preceding work (Koskela 2000; Mossman 2007). Figure 8 shows an illustration of 
the seven preconditions.  
 
 
Figure 8: The 7 preconditions for a construction activity (adapted from Koskela 2000)  
 
Furthermore, Mossman (2007) explains how bringing information, equipment, materials 
and personnel to the workface creates no value in itself. Value is only created when they 
all come together at the workface.  
Ballard (2000) proposes four levels of planning in the Last Planner system: 
 Master schedule  
This is the strategic plan with major milestones for the entire project. It refers 
to what needs to be done.  
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 Phase scheduling 
This is a more detailed plan of the master schedule, and is created by the team 
that manages and work in each phase. It refers to should be done. 
 Look ahead plan  
In this plan the workflow is arranged in the best achievable sequence and rate 
by checking the seven prerequisites. It also serves as a logistical plan. It refers 
to what can be done.  
 Weekly work plan 
The weekly work plan contains a list of assignments and work tasks the last 
planner has committed to be complete within the coming week. It refers to 
what will be done 
 
In the last planner system, the percentage plan complete (PPC), is used as a measure on 
how much of the weekly work plan that has actually been completed (Ballard 2000).  
 
The Last Planner system is illustrated in figure 9.  
 
Figure 9: The last planner system (Dao and Follestad 2009) 
 
However, Ala-Risku and Kärkkäinen (2006) suggest that there are two material flow 
management challenges in the Last Planner System: (1) The last planner must have 
access to information concerning materials availability for individual project tasks and 
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(2) materials should be readily available without excessive inventory on-site. 
Particularly, they point to giving information to the last planner about material 
availability is a challenge as materials are often not registered in any inventory control 
system, but have to be visually controlled to ensure availability. Therefore, materials 
are often ordered well in advance to ensure availability when needed, thus creating 
large inventory buffers on site. This results in problems for materials handling on site 
and increases the risk of damaged materials. Consequently, they argue that continuous 
planning on single construction task level, such as the Last Planner, places two 
requirements for materials deliveries: (1) transparency of inventory levels on-site and 
other stages in the supply chain and (2) short response times along the supply chain 
(Ala-Risku and Kärkkäinen 2006).  
They propose a solution in two parts. First, in order to increase visibility of inventory 
levels on site and other stages in the supply chain, they suggest a tool based on 
shipment tracking for site inventories and short-term storages most critical for the 
project tasks. Second, in order to ensure availability of materials without excessive 
inventory, they propose the use of the near-term schedule from the Last Planner system 
as a means of communication between project site and materials suppliers (Ala-Risku 
and Kärkkäinen 2006).  
2.6.5. Variability and reliability issues in construction supply 
chains 
Bertelsen (2005) suggest that the complex nature of construction often results in great 
variability in the flows of work, information, crew, materials and space. Sources of 
variability include late delivery of material and equipment, design errors and change 
orders (Abdelhamid and Everett 2002).   
 
Similarly, Arbulu and Ballard (2004) point to how variability is omnipresent in any 
production and supply system, and how supply chain variability creates waste and can 
potentially impact the on-time delivery of a project. Particularly, they point the 
matching of supply and demand, and how any type of variability of either demand or 
supply can negatively impact project performance.  
Moreover, variability can be described as the opposite to reliability, the lower the 
variability the higher the reliability in the system. In a perfect situation, demand and 
supply are perfectly reliable (zero variability), and materials and information flow 
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continuously. More realistic, however, is that either demand or supply or both have 
some variability. When supply is more reliable than demand, inventories accumulate on 
site, while when demand is more reliable than supply WIP increases and project delays 
may occur due to lack of resources (Arbulu and Ballard 2004).  
 
Furthermore, Arbulu and Ballard (2004, 4) state: “Any type of variability in both 
demand and supply will be critical to the effective project management and will impact 
the total production system performance increasing cost and time and reducing quality 
and safety”.  
 
Accordingly, variability is ever present in construction supply chains, and is particularly 
recognised by poor workflow reliability between production processes as a result of 
demand and supply variability. Arbulu, Koerckel and Espana (2005) report that 
workflow reliability has been repeatedly measured at levels from 30-60 %, and argue 
that improving workflow reliability is synonymous with increasing the accuracy of site 
demand.  
Consequently, improving the workflow reliability is the equivalent to reducing 
variability, and thereby reducing the share of non-value adding activities in the 
production processes and the corresponding supply chains.  
 
  
  
62 
 
3. Methodology 
This chapter will describe the methodological approach for this thesis. The first part 
will outline the research design, before the selected case-study approach will be 
described. Following that, the data collection methods used will be summarised, before 
the validity and reliability issues will be discussed and the research model described.   
3.1. Research design 
Research is conducted to obtain information regarding a specific research question, and 
the selected research design should be closely linked with the purpose of the research. 
The purpose of the research can either be of an exploratory, explanatory, descriptive or 
predictive nature. Exploratory research is conducted when the purpose is to explore a 
little known phenomenon, while explanatory research is conducted when the purpose is 
to explain a phenomenon  (Ellram 1996; Yin 2003; Marshall and Rossman 1999).   
The purpose of this thesis has an exploratory-explanatory nature. This combined 
character is due to the twofold research problem. First, the thesis aims to explore what 
activities in the value streams that delay the flow of materials and differences between 
the two supply chains, thus making the exploratory research design appropriate. 
Secondly, the thesis aims to explain the underlying reason for these delays and 
differences, thus making the explanatory research design appropriate. Furthermore, as 
the thesis aims to explore the applicability of lean supply chain management approaches 
to a Norwegian shipyard based on the evidence from the two value streams assessed, an 
exploratory-explanatory research approach was considered suitable.  
3.2. Case study research 
Yin (2003, 13) defines a case study as an empirical inquiry that “investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly defined”.   
Building on this definition, he discusses how a case study approach appears suitable 
when the variables tend to be vague, the researcher has little or no control over other 
events and the researcher investigates a contemporary phenomenon.  
Furthermore, he put forward six key sources of evidence applicable to case studies; 
documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observation, participant observation 
and physical artifacts. The use of these sources in this thesis will be further discussed in 
the next section.  
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There is also a distinction between single case study and multiple case studies. Multiple 
case studies occur when the same study contain more than one case. However, Yin 
(2003) argue that single and multiple case studies are variants from the same 
methodological framework.  
For this thesis a case study approach has been chosen. This approach is considered 
appropriate as it allows for investigation of non-value adding activities and sources of 
these within a real-world environment and as multiple sources of evidence will be used. 
In addition, although the selected approach is a single case study of the flow of 
materials to and within Ulstein shipyard, the two different supply chains evaluated in 
this thesis will be treated as two different cases, thus enabling for comparison between 
the two.  
It should be noted, however, that the purpose of this thesis is to enhance the 
understanding of what activities in the value stream that delay the flow of materials and 
why these delays occur, rather than an in-depth and detailed quantitative analysis of the 
two supply chains.  
3.2.1. Data collection 
Data collection refers to the process of collecting the empirical evidence or information 
through one or more data collection methods, and serves as a basis for analysis. 
Data can be categorised as either qualitative or quantitative techniques, and collected 
through for example questionnaires, interviews, observations and experiments. 
Qualitative data are typically descriptive data and the results are often expressed 
verbally to create an understanding of the phenomenon in question, while quantitative 
data are precise measurements and mathematical analysis with the results often 
expressed in numerical and quantifiable terms. In addition, data can be either of 
primary or secondary character. Primary data refers to data collected for the purpose of 
the specific research, while secondary data is existing data collected primarily for other 
purposes (Ellram 1996).  
 
In this thesis, qualitative methods for data collection have been applied. The data 
consists of primary data collected from interviews and (direct) observation and 
secondary data such as archival records, documentation and data collected for other 
research projects. An overview of the data collection methods applied in this thesis can 
be seen in table 1. The reason for selecting a qualitative methodology was mainly that 
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the qualitative research and data collection methods were considered more suitable for 
the purpose of this research. When considering that the purpose of the study to study is 
to contribute to the understanding of what in the value stream that delay and interrupt 
the flow of materials, and why these delays and/or interruptions occur, as well as the 
time frame for this study a qualitative approach was found suitable. In addition, this is 
the first research paper conducted with Ulstein regarding supply chain management and 
the flow of materials to and within the shipyard. Therefore, a qualitative approach was 
selected as it was considered the most suitable to obtain a holistic perspective of the two 
supply chains and to be able to compare the two supply chains, within the time frame of 
this thesis.  
 
On the other hand, it was considered early in the research process to have a more 
quantitative approach to this thesis, involving physically following and mapping the 
flow of materials in the two supply chains. This method could have resulted in more 
quantitative measurements of waste by identifying lead time, cycle time, processing 
time, non- value adding time and similar. There are, however, several reasons why this 
method was not selected. The first and most important reason is the lack of access to 
data from Brunvoll did not make it possible to map the whole value stream from 
Brunvoll to Ulstein, and as this could have been a feasible method for mapping the GS-
Hydro- Ulstein value stream, the comparison would then have been made on different 
grounds. Furthermore, it was considered only to map the internal flow within the 
shipyard from when the thrusters arrived to installation, but this was not feasible within 
the time frame of this thesis. The thrusters were expected to be delivered in late April 
and in June, but the delivery dates were uncertain in the beginning of the research 
process, thus this method was not considered feasible within the time frame of this 
thesis.   
Second, it was considered that through this method, a holistic perspective of the two 
supply chains would not be covered in the same degree as with a qualitative method. 
In addition, the lack of access to quantitative data, such as the manufacturing time at 
Brunvoll, and cycle time and storage time at Ulstein, also favoured a qualitative 
methodology. However, some quantitative archival records were used to support and 
validate the qualitative data.  
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Table 1: Overview of data collection methods used 
 Qualitative data Quantitative data 
Primary - Interviews 
- Observation 
 
Secondary - Documentation 
- Other research projects 
- Archival records 
 
 
The main source of primary information for this study was interviews. Interviews are 
one of the most important sources of information in a case study, and in a case study 
interviews are typically guided conversations rather than structures queries, where the 
researcher explores a few general topics to uncover the interviewees’ views and 
perceptions of the topics in question, while allowing for the interviewees to structure 
their own response. The most common type of case study interviews are open-ended 
interviews, where interviewees are asked both about facts and opinions concerning the 
topic (Marshall and Rossman 1999; Yin 2003).    
 
For this study, open-ended interviews were selected. The main reason for this is that it 
allowed for flexibility in the interviews, which was considered important to obtain an 
understanding of the current situation and the issues in the supply chains, in order to 
answer the research problem. The interviews were conducted with employees in 
different positions within Ulstein and GS-Hydro. The interviews with employees at 
Ulstein were carried out in two rounds. The first round of interviews was mainly used 
to obtain an overview and understanding of the current situation. The second round of 
interviews were more in-depth targeting the issues identified in the first round of 
interviews. The interviews at Ulstein related to GS-Hydro were mainly conducted with 
a project manager and purchasers, while the interviews related to Brunvoll were 
conducted with a purchaser. For the interviews related to the internal flow of materials, 
interviews were conducted with the internal logistics manager and other employees in 
the warehouse function. In addition, informal conversations with employees working in 
warehouse were also conducted to obtain an overview of the current situation.  
 
The interviews with GS-Hydro were conducted in a single round, and the employees 
interviewed included purchasing director, logistics manager, distribution coordinator 
and warehouse manager. Similarly, these interviews were open-ended to allow for 
flexibility to obtain an understanding of the current situation. Even though the actual 
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interviews with GS-Hydro were conducted in a single round, GS-Hydro was visited in 
the beginning of the research process to discuss the purpose and methodology of the 
thesis, and the current situation for GS-Hydro 
 
Furthermore, direct observation was also used a source of primary information, 
particularly to obtain an understanding of the actual processes and activities within in 
the shipyard. The observations were mainly done on the first visit to Ulstein, by 
walking around the premises accompanied by the internal logistics manager who 
explained the processes and activities.  
 
In terms of the secondary data used in this thesis, two main sources were used; archival 
records and documentation. The archival records used are mainly related to historic 
orders from Ulstein to GS-Hydro in 2010 and 2011, and were obtained from both 
parties. These archival records were used for the analysis of the supply chain. In 
addition, the archival records also included some historic figures concerning 
transportation costs for March 2012.  
The documentation used is related to the correspondence between Ulstein and Brunvoll 
for project no. 295. For each project, Ulstein log all correspondence, both of a technical 
and commercial nature, with Brunvoll (or other A-component suppliers) in a database. 
The documentation used for this thesis was the correspondence of a commercial nature 
between Brunvoll and Ulstein for build no. 295. The reason for not including the 
technical correspondence in the analysis is mainly due to the large quantities of data 
combined with that it was considered that a large proportion of the data would not be 
relevant for this thesis. Therefore, the commercial correspondence was the most 
relevant and interesting for this study, and the technical correspondence was important 
to know of, instead of going into details.  
For future reference, the figures and tables which are not specifically referenced to, 
mainly in the case findings and discussion parts, are created for this thesis specifically, 
either based on the archival records obtained from either Ulstein or GS-Hydro or as an 
illustration.    
 
In addition, information from other research projects, particularly Longva (2009), were 
used mainly to obtain an overview and understanding of the flow of materials through 
the warehouse within the shipyard.   
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3.2.2. Validity and reliability   
Validity and reliability are two important aspects in order to evaluate the quality of a 
research, particularly for research of a qualitative nature, because there is no coherent 
set of methods for a qualitative research and qualitative research may be subject to a of 
lack of objectivism (Peräkylä 2004). 
Yin (2003) describe three different concepts addressing the validity in research; (1) 
Construct validity, (2) internal validity and (3) external validity. Construct validity is 
concerned with establishing the correct operational measures for the concepts being 
studied. Internal validity is related to testing causal relationships between variables, 
while external validity is related to applicability and generalisation of the findings.  
 
This thesis has attempted to construct validity through the method of triangulation. 
Triangulation is a concept constructing validity by applying multiple sources of 
evidence, as findings and conclusions based on several sources of evidence are more 
precise and convincing than using a single source of information, particularly in a case 
study research design (Yin 2003). In this thesis triangulation has been attempted by 
using multiple sources of evidence, including interviews, observation and archival 
records. Furthermore, in the case of the link between GS-Hydro and Ulstein, interviews 
were conducted with employees in both firms, which allowed for opinions and 
perceptions from both sides, which again should strengthen the validity of the study. 
Similarly, interviews were conducted with employees in different positions in both 
Ulstein and GS-Hydro, and thus information was obtained from different employees 
with different perceptions and opinions about the topic, again a source of strengthened 
validity.  
This was also the case with the interviews concerning the Brunvoll-Ulstein supply 
chain link. However, Brunvoll was not participating, thus the interviews were 
conducted with employees at Ulstein. For the information flow, interviews were 
conducted with one of the purchasers, again in two rounds. Triangulation is then 
constructed with two different rounds of interview combined with the documentation of 
the correspondence between Brunvoll and Ulstein. Ideally, interviews should have been 
conducted with Brunvoll as well, to obtain a perspective from both sides. However, as 
this was not possible, it was selected to evaluate the information flow from Ulstein’s 
perspective.  
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Furthermore, the first round of interviews with Ulstein was written down, while the 
second round of interviews with Ulstein and the interviews with GS-Hydro were 
recorded, after approval of the interviewees, to avoid misinterpretations and/or 
information being lost.  
 
In terms of the reliability of a research, this is concerned with the replication of the 
study, and whether the same results would be achieved if the case study was conducted 
all over again. The goal of reliability is therefore to minimise bias and errors in the 
study. An important aspect to ensure reliability of a study, is to document the 
procedures undertaken in the study, thus allowing for other researchers or reviewers to 
conduct a similar research or examine the reliability of the research (Yin 2003), which 
is the aim of this methodological framework chapter and the information in the 
appendices. Some of the interview guides used for the interviews and extracts from the 
archival records and correspondence can be found in the appendices (appendix II and 
III).  
3.3. Research model 
The research model in figure 10 illustrates the focus and expected findings of this 
thesis. Ulstein, as the focal firm are linked with the two suppliers, Brunvoll and GS-
Hydro. The components from GS-Hydro have (relatively) high-volumes, low-unit price 
and short lead time, while the components from Brunvoll have (relatively) low-
volumes, high-unit price and long lead time. Based on this nature of the two supply 
chain links and the literature, it is expected that the main flow impacting the supply 
chain performance is the material flow for the GS-Hydro- Ulstein link and the 
information flow for the Brunvoll- Ulstein supply chain link. 
Furthermore, based on the literature discussed above and findings from other 
researchers the two last columns in the figure represent the expected findings in this 
thesis.  
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Figure 10: Research model 
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4. Case study findings  
As another step towards the Ulstein production system, a production system based on 
lean principles and tailored to the specific characteristics of Ulstein, this case study is 
aiming to enhance the understanding of waste and delays in the two value streams.  
The intention of this case study is therefore to investigate the two supply chains from 
GS-Hydro and Brunvoll supplying B-and C-components and A-components, 
respectively, to Ulstein, in order to identify what type of waste that is interrupting a 
continuous flow in the current situation. In figure 11 the supply chains are illustrated, 
where Ulstein is the focal firm, the ship owner is the first tier customer, while Brunvoll 
and GS-Hydro are first tier suppliers. Further upstream (tier 2 and 3 suppliers) there is a 
wide network of different suppliers, not considered in this thesis.  
 
 
Figure 11: Supply chain configuration 
 
This chapter will put forward the findings from the case study which will describe the 
current situation, including how the two value steams are currently configured and what 
is interrupting a streamlined flow of materials in the two supply chains. 
Building on the findings outlined in this chapter, the sources of waste and delays, and 
the managerial implications for the supply chain participants will be discussed in the 
subsequent chapter.  
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4.1. Value stream from GS-Hydro to Ulstein 
From the research model described previously, and by following the argument of 
Wegelius-Lehtonen and Pahkala (1998), the main focus of this supply chain is the 
physical flow of materials, particularly due to the short lead time and the relatively 
standardised components flowing in the value stream.   
According to a VSM approach described above, the first step is to selecting a product 
family and setting the boundary conditions. In terms of this value stream the product 
family is defined as all the components supplied from GS-Hydro to Ulstein, which 
Ulstein categorises as B and C components, where B components are project-specific 
and C components are consumables. On the other hand, GS-Hydro’s consider these as 
similar components, with both being supplied mainly from their finished goods 
inventory.  
In terms of other boundary conditions, the value stream analysis is limited to the flow 
of materials from GS-Hydro to Ulstein and internally within the shipyard (focal firm 
and tier 1 supplier), even though other parties exist both further upstream and 
downstream in the supply chain. For future reference, the term external flow is used 
here to describe the flow from GS-Hydro to Ulstein, while the term internal flow is used 
to describe the flow of materials within the shipyard, after Ulstein receives the 
materials. The focus of this supply chain and the boundary conditions are illustrated in 
figure 12 (in comparison to figure 11).  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Focus and boundary condition of GS-Hydro- Ulstein supply chain link 
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4.1.1. Flow 
Following a VSM approach, the next step is to create a current state map of the 
processes the materials flow through in the value stream and this can be linked with the 
lean principle of identifying the value stream, in order to highlight waste and serve as a 
basis for improvement. Therefore, this section will describe the current value stream 
from GS-Hydro and Ulstein within the boundary conditions outlined above. It should be 
noted that the analysis of the current state does not consist of quantitative measurements 
such as cycle time and value creating time, mainly due to lack of data and the choice of 
having a more qualitative analysis, as described above.  
 
Before the flow of materials is described, the ordering procedure from Ulstein to GS-
Hydro should be outlined. The B-components are typically ordered through a tendering 
process including several suppliers, with the main criteria being price, but also delivery 
date is considered. Upon agreement an estimate of the requirements for a project is 
allocated in storage at GS-Hydro, and the components are ordered, based on the 
agreement, by the foremen at Ulstein when the components are required in production 
on a daily or weekly basis. 
The C-components are ordered by the workers in the warehouse at Ulstein by manually 
scanning barcodes located at each components storage space in the warehouse, which 
electronically generates the order. The scanning is typically done one a daily basis 
based on visibly low inventory levels, stockouts in the shelves or anticipated upcoming 
usage. The quantities that are to be replenished are determined by the workers and are 
typically based on the experience of the workers or in some cases informal 
communication about short term requirements from the foremen.  
 
An order from Ulstein to GS-Hydro can be served by GS-Hydro from two locations; the 
central warehouse at Frogner or the regional warehouse in Ålesund.  
When the orders are served from the central warehouse, the orders have to be received 
at GS-Hydro before the cut-off time for next day delivery at 15:00. The orders are then 
registered and released for picking based on the requested delivery date. The order 
release system at GS-Hydro is setup so that orders are released to be delivered on the 
requested delivery date from the customers, regardless of how far in advance the order 
is placed. In addition, the order release system prioritises orders based on the strategic 
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significance of the customer for GS-Hydro, thus ensuring that the orders from strategic 
customers (including Ulstein) are picked first. The materials are picked from four 
different picking areas; automated picking, general picking area, tubes and pipes.   
The orders to the same regions are then consolidated and shipped in bulk, leaving 
Frogner around 17.30 (day 0). For the Møre region the goods are transported by 
Transferd, to their terminal in Ålesund. Here, the orders are received around 04.00 (day 
1) where they are sorted and distributed, leaving the terminal on fixed delivery routes 
around 08.00 (day 1) in part load to each customer by Transferd. The customer should 
receive the materials around 12.00 (day 1), thus the lead time from order is released for 
picking at GS-Hydro to the components are received at Ulstein is less than 24 hours. 
This flow is illustrated in figure 13.  
 
 
 
Figure 13: Current state flow: Deliveries directly from GS-Hydro Frogner 
 
For the orders served from the regional warehouse in Ålesund, these are normally 
orders for components required by Ulstein the same day. These are picked at the 
regional warehouse when the order is received, and delivered to Ulstein typically within 
3-4 hours. However, the replenishment to the regional warehouse is done from the 
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central warehouse at Frogner with an internal order either on a one-out, one-in basis, or 
when inventory reaches a minimum level at the regional warehouse. These components 
thus have to go through the same processes as components shipped directly from central 
warehouse to customers, before they are received, registered and stored at the Ålesund 
warehouse and later picked and shipped to the customers. This flow is illustrated in 
figure 14. 
 
 
Figure 14: Current state flow: Delivery from GS-Hydro Ålesund 
 
The archival records used to obtain an overview of the value stream did not differ 
between B-and C-components, thus the supplier location the different materials are 
shipped from are difficult to evaluate. However, the interviews revealed that C- 
components are normally delivered the day after the order is sent, thus indicating that 
C-components are normally shipped from the central warehouse at Frogner. It should 
also be noted that although C-components are not project specific, they are ordered for 
the ship that at the time is in the docking hall, mainly for book-keeping purposes.  
In the case of Ulstein ordering prefabricated (MTO) components from GS-Hydro, a 
manufacturing lead time is added to the lead time. In addition, GS-Hydro can also 
provide components not in their inventory, and in this case the lead time will vary with 
the delivery lead time from the sub-supplier. However, it was reported that the majority 
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Frogner  Ålesund  Ålesund
Receive Receive Receive Day 0: Receive 
internal order goods goods  12:00 goods
Register Register Register 
 goods goods goods
Release order Sort Store Store
for picking goods  goods  goods
Ship goods Day 0: Pick Pick/
(part load) 08:00  goods Distribute
Ship goods Ship goods 
 (bulk)  (part load)
Ulstein
Install/use
Pick goods
Register order
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of components Ulstein order from GS-Hydro is held as finished goods inventory at GS-
Hydro.  
In terms of the flow of materials within the shipyard, this was evaluated from a more 
general perspective regarding B-and C-components, rather than for components 
specifically from GS-Hydro. This was mainly due to difficulties in differing on 
suppliers in the internal flow, but also as a more general perspective was desired. From 
the figures 13 and 14, it is clear that the processes after the components are received are 
similar regardless of from where the components are shipped.  
When the components arrive at the shipyard they are received in the warehouse, where 
the components are registered and stored. As no formal planning is made for the arrival 
of incoming trucks, this is conducted as soon as possible after the arrival of trucks. The 
components are registered in the ERP- system within 24 hours unless deviations occur.  
 
Both B- and C- components flow through the same receiving and registration processes, 
but are treated somewhat differently after this. C-components are stored at fixed 
locations in the warehouse with the main location being within the warehouse. In 
addition, there is also a separate storage location for C-components within the docking 
hall. B-components, on the other hand, do not have a fixed storage location and storage 
location is decided based on where it is available space, and when the warehouse 
personnel expect the components to be used. In addition to the warehouse, there are 
additional tents used for storage placed within the shipyard. The storage location is 
registered in the ERP-system with rack and shelf if located in the warehouse, and with 
tent number if stored in one of the tents.  
 
The actual storage lead times are not known for either B- or C-components as 
withdrawal from storage is not registered. As a result, the components are typically 
treated as used when the ship is delivered to the client. For the internal picking and 
distribution, the components, both B and C, are typically picked by installation workers 
as they require them. Larger components, which workers are unable to carry, are 
transported to the building site by warehouse workers often based on a “need it now” 
request from the foremen or installation workers, as no formal planning is made for the 
internal distribution.  
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Although not within the boundary conditions of the value stream analysis, it is worth 
mentioning the order and delivery process from supplier (tier 2) to GS-Hydro. The lead 
time for these materials differs significantly. For components stored at finished goods 
inventory at supplier, the lead time is only the transportation time from suppliers, 
mainly located outside Norway. However, many of GS-Hydro’s suppliers make-to-
order, thus the lead time is increased with the manufacturing lead time. Particularly, 
pipes are produced to order at the suppliers mainly located in Asia and the lead time can 
vary from 4 to 12 months depending on the availability of raw materials and market 
fluctuations. The orders from GS-Hydro to suppliers are typically based on historical 
data and forecasts. For their strategic components, such as pipes, GS-Hydro has 
consolidated the purchasing on a global level to obtain better conditions and to better 
cope with forecasts errors and demand uncertainties. The components MTO by the 
supplier are typically received at GS-Hydro’s central warehouse two months before 
shipped to customer, but this may vary.  
Clearly, there is also a flow of information between the different departments of sales, 
purchasing, engineering, production, planning and warehousing at Ulstein. However, as 
the main focus of the internal flow has been physical flow of materials, the information 
flow has not been analysed or mapped explicitly. Nevertheless, the internal information 
flow is clearly impacting the flow of materials, and this is taken into consideration in 
the analysis of the flow of materials.  
4.1.2. Waste 
As described above, there are seven original sources of waste in lean thinking; 
overproduction, waiting, excessive transportation and inventory, inappropriate 
processing, unnecessary motion and defects (rework). Since the focus of this value 
stream is mainly the physical flow of materials, the waste aspect here is related to 
activities, processes or structural arrangements that causes delays and/or interruptions in 
the flow of materials.  
In this case, particularly three lean wastes were identified consistently throughout the 
flow of materials in this supply chain: (1) Excessive transportation, (2) excessive 
inventory and (3) waiting.  
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4.1.2.1. Excessive transportation 
In lean theory the aim is to minimise transportation, as every movement of goods can be 
considered waste. In this value steam, excessive transportation was evident in both the 
external flow of materials to Ulstein, and in the internal flow of materials within the 
shipyard. 
In terms of the external flow, particularly the use of the regional warehouse in Ålesund 
results in increased transportation. Figure 15 shows the share of total tonnage ordered 
by Ulstein from GS-Hydro that is supplied from the different GS-Hydro locations in 
2010 and 2011. In 2010 and 2011, 55 % and 34% respectively, of the total tonnage was 
supplied from GS-Hydro’s regional warehouse in Ålesund.  
 
From the description above, it is clear that the regional warehouse in Ålesund has to be 
replenished from the central warehouse on the same route as direct deliveries to Ulstein, 
and thus the use of the regional warehouse clearly increases the transportation of 
materials in the delivery process. In addition, the location of the regional warehouse in 
Ålesund in relation to the Transferd terminal and Ulstein, increases the time and 
complexity of the transportation (see map in appendix V).  
Correspondingly, figure 16 shows the share of total orders served from different GS- 
Hydro locations in 2010 and 2011. This was in 2010 and 2011, 64 % and 51 %, 
respectively from Ålesund. Although this further emphasises that the extra 
transportation is delaying the flow of materials, there is a trend that both a larger share 
of the total tonnage and a larger share of the total orders are supplied from the central 
warehouse at Frogner since the change to a central warehouse in 2011.  
However, a major part of this waste is the extra handling in the delivery process. For 
instance, the materials shipped from GS-Hydro Ålesund to Ulstein have to go through 
the processes of receiving, registering, storing and picking three times, both at GS-
Hydro’s central and regional warehouses and Ulstein’s warehouse, in addition to the 
receiving, sorting and shipping at the Transferd terminal outside Ålesund, before they 
can be used in production. This additional handling is also increasing the risk for 
materials being damaged, lost or delayed in the delivery process.  
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Figure 15: Share of annual total tonnage from GS-Hydro location in 2010 and 2011  
 
 
 
 
Figure 16: Share of annual orders served from GS-Hydro location in 2010 and 2011 
 
In addition, the findings also indicate that the use of a regional warehouse in Ålesund 
also has a large impact on transportation costs. In the current situation, it was informed 
in the interviews that Ulstein often order from GS-Hydro in the morning what they 
require in production later the same day. Due to the location of the central warehouse, 
this cannot be serviced from Frogner, and in the current distribution system there is no 
delivery route able to serve these urgent orders. As a result, in 2010 and 2011, 92% and 
77%, respectively, of the orders supplied from Ålesund, were sent by couriers typically 
being 3-4 times more expensive than using the fares negotiated by GS-Hydro with 
Transferd.  
More specific, figure 17 shows the tonnage and net price for transportation with both 
Transferd and couriers for the shipments from GS-Hydro to Ulstein in March 2012. Of 
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the 52 shipments, 26 were sent with couriers counting for 9 % of the total tonnage, 
while counting for nearly one third of the total transportation costs. This gives a 
transportation cost per kilo with couriers more than four times higher compared to 
transportation with the distributor Transferd. This adds up to a potential saving of 22% 
for the transportation costs for the orders from GS-Hydro in March 2012 if all the 
components were shipped with Transferd. 
 
Figure 17: Tonnage and net price for transportation from Ålesund in March 2012 
 
As a result, it seems obvious that the extra handling and transportation is not adding 
value the materials, but rather delaying the flow of materials in this supply chain link. It 
should also be noted that in the current situation Ulstein has free shipping from GS-
Hydro, thus the cost saving potential for Ulstein is difficult to estimate, as the extra 
shipping costs is typically indirectly transferred to the customer(s), for instance through 
higher prices. There is, however, clearly a large cost saving potential in a value chain 
perspective.  
In terms of the internal flow, excessive transportation was also reported for B- 
components, mainly with respect to double handling and moving the components. The 
findings suggest that this is particularly due to the lack of fixed storage location and the 
uncertainty of when arriving components are required in production. For instance, it 
was reported that it is not unusual that a required component is stored behind another 
components, thus resulting in extra moving and handling of the components in front to 
get access to the components required in production.  
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4.1.2.2. Excessive inventory  
The second lean waste consistently identified in the supply chain is excessive inventory. 
As described above, excessive inventory refers to having too much inventory or having 
materials available too far in advance before it is needed in production. Lean theory 
suggests that excessive inventory tend to increase lead time, prevent fast identification 
of problems and increase space requirements, as well as increasing inventory holding 
costs.  
In terms of the external flow, excessive inventory was evident both at the central 
warehouse at Frogner and at the regional warehouse in Ålesund. For the central 
warehouse the excessive inventory is particularly related to having the “wrong” 
inventory. The interviews suggested that as little as 10% of the finished goods 
inventory counts for up to 90% of the sales for GS-Hydro. The rest of the inventory is 
typically categorised as slow-moving items resulting from ordering too much or wrong 
components from suppliers, as this is based on historical data and forecasts, due to lack 
of access to actual demand information.  
Similarly, it was reported that having fresh and fast-moving inventory, with the right 
components is the main challenge for GS-Hydro, and therefore the warehouse often 
exists of excessive inventory in terms of slow- moving items or even non-moving, 
outdated items. 
The findings suggest that the main impact on the flow of materials of having inventory 
that is outdated and not adjusted to the actual customer demand is when components are 
not in finished goods inventory at GS-Hydro. In that case, GS-Hydro has to acquire the 
components from their suppliers which increase the lead time. For GS-Hydro this can 
also lead to loss of sales, as Ulstein may go to another supplier for the components. In 
addition, excessive inventory also impact the cost perspective as this imply that 
unnecessary capital is tied up in the system.  
 
Regarding the warehouse at Ulstein excessive inventory was evident for both B- and C- 
components. For B- components, these are procured specifically to the requirements of 
a project, so the excessive inventory is mainly related to having materials available too 
far in advance. For instance, a safety margin of 1-2 weeks was reported as not unusual.  
However, it can be argued that such a safety margin is necessary in the current situation 
due to the time constraints in a project. Therefore, and more importantly, is the impact 
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this have on the internal flow of materials. Particularly, as the warehouse personnel in 
not informed when arriving components are required in production, this put pressure on 
storage space, which again leads to extra handling and moving as described above and 
concerning waiting which will be described below.  
For C- components, this is mainly related to having too much inventory available, often 
of the “wrong” components. Especially, this is typically caused by inconsistent and 
unclear, or lack of, communication from production to the warehouse personnel about 
upcoming requirements, resulting in orders often being based on experience and 
guessing. However, due to the low unit value of these components and the fixed and 
separated storage space, excessive inventory of C- components is not considered have a 
large impact on inventory holding costs or interrupting the flow of more critical 
components. Therefore, more importantly is to have the right inventory in terms of both 
volume and type of components to reduce the risk of stockouts, which can have a larger 
impact on project performance.   
 
4.1.2.3. Waiting  
The third lean waste delaying the flow of materials identified consistently in the supply 
chain link between GS-Hydro and Ulstein is the time materials are waiting to be 
processed or the time workers are waiting to process the materials.  
 
In terms of the external flow of materials, the interviews revealed that one of the main 
challenges for the warehouse at GS-Hydro is that the majority of daily orders are 
received and released for picking between midday and 4 p.m. during a day, as the cut-
off to send order for next day delivery is at 3 p.m. In other words, workers are waiting 
for orders to come in from customers and be released for picking, putting additional 
pressure on workers to ensure timely delivery. Particularly, as having a central 
warehouse requires transporters to have a fixed departure time from GS-Hydro to be 
able to deliver the materials to the different regions within 24 hours.  
This has been overcome by GS-Hydro by having double shifts of workers during this 
period. However, it was reported that not having time to complete orders, due to large 
batches of orders to be picked before the truck leaves the central warehouse, is the main 
reason for not being able to deliver the materials on time the next day. As a result of 
having a central warehouse not it close proximity to customers, a missed shipment will 
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result in a one day delay of the materials, as it has to be sent the next day. Nevertheless, 
GS-Hydro reported that only 2-3 % of domestic orders are typically not shipped on 
time, and as GS-Hydro prioritise the orders based on strategic significance of the 
customers (A, B and C) these are orders normally to non-strategic customers. Ulstein is 
a strategic customer for GS- Hydro, and thus the orders from Ulstein have first priority.     
 
This waste is also related to the excessive inventory in the supply chain described 
above, thus resulting in materials are waiting in finished goods inventory before they 
are shipped to the customers, both tying up capital and storage space and increasing the 
risk of materials becoming obsolete. No direct measures were found or reported, but the 
interviews at GS-Hydro revealed that the time materials are held in finished goods 
inventory at either the central or regional warehouse varies greatly. For instance, up to 
90% of the inventory are slow moving items as described above, thus indicating that 
materials are sitting idle not producing any value in the warehouses before usage. 
Similarly, the interviews revealed that materials with long lead time from manufacturer 
(tier 2 supplier), such as pipes, are typically held in finished goods inventory at central 
warehouse for around 2 months often being allocated to customers. This is mainly due 
to the long lead time from manufacturers, combined with the uncertain demand from 
customers.  
 
Regarding the waiting in the warehouse at Ulstein, the storage time was not accurately 
measured because information was not available from Ulstein, since the warehouse 
does not register when materials are withdrawn from storage. However, the interviews 
indicated that components are often held in the warehouse for a longer period of time 
after arrival before the components are requested in production. For B- components, 
this was mainly related to materials arriving too early at the shipyard, while for C-
components this is typically caused by lack of information available about upcoming 
requirement, thus resulting in the wrong components or excessive quantities being 
purchased.  
 
Furthermore, deviations were reported in both the external and internal flow of 
materials as being time consuming, thus delaying the flow of goods.  
In the external flow, deviations were reported in both at the central and regional 
warehouse, mainly in terms of picking errors. Although picking errors were less than 
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1% of total orders picked at the central warehouse in 2011 and mainly related to wrong 
quantities, this was reported as very time consuming to handle. In addition, due to the 
location of the central warehouse, one picking error can have a major impact for the 
customer, as the component can typically not be delivered until the next day. Picking 
errors happen more often in the regional warehouses, and is clearly interrupting a 
streamlined flow of materials, but due to the proximity to the customer, this have less 
impact on the customers’ production compared to picking errors at the central 
warehouse.  
For the internal flow of materials, deviations particularly occurred in the receiving 
process. Deviations are related to for instance wrong quantities, wrong components, 
incomplete deliveries, and incomplete or lack of paperwork. In addition, deviations 
were also reported regarding the arrivals of incoming trucks. In the current situation, the 
arrival of incoming trucks is not planned at the warehouse, but the warehouse personnel 
have access to information regarding the confirmed delivery date. However, both the 
interviews and the archival records showed that the actual delivery date and confirmed 
delivery date deviated (largely) in many cases.  
 
Figure 18: Deviations confirmed delivery from actual delivery  
 
In figure 18, the deviations between confirmed delivery dates and actual delivery dates 
are illustrated for shipments from GS-Hydro in 2010 and 2011. Less than zero means 
that the materials are delivered before the confirmed date in the ERP system, higher 
than zero means that the materials are delivered after the confirmed date, while equal to 
zero means the materials are delivered on the day they were expected.  
Clearly, the figure shows that 86% and 79% of the orders where delivered later than the 
confirmed delivery date in the ERP system, while only 8% and 6%  were delivered on 
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the same day as confirmed date registered in the ERP system, in 2010 and 2011 
respectively. However, this does not necessarily indicate that the deliveries from GS-
Hydro are delayed. These deviations may also be caused lags in the registration, wrong 
date in the ERP system or that delivery dates in the ERP system are not updated after 
changes from the purchasing department. This is an example of how the poor 
information flow internally, impacts the flow of materials.  
Therefore, the main point to draw from these deviations is the impact it has on the 
warehouse personnel and thus indirectly on the flow of materials. For instance, this 
information is the only available information the warehouse personnel have concerning 
the incoming trucks. As a result of this information it not reflecting the actual delivery 
date, it is difficult for the warehouse personnel to do any planning, particularly for B- 
components, with respect to the receiving process and allocation of storage location. As 
described above, C- components from GS-Hydro are normally delivered the day after 
they are ordered by the warehouse personnel, thus arrivals are expected.  
Consequently, the interviews revealed that this inability to plan incoming deliveries, 
leads to peaks in in the workload for the workers, thus incoming materials are waiting 
to be processes due to lack of capacity to receive, register and store many deliveries at 
the same time.   
Furthermore, this in combination with lack of available data about when components 
are needed in production leads to poor utilisation of the storage location as components 
are stored where it is space available, rather than being based on when components are 
needed in production. In addition to the double handling described above, this also 
results in workers having to spend time searching for components within the storage 
locations. Some searching was suggested to also be related to incomplete information 
from production workers requesting materials from the warehouse.  
As it is mainly the same workers handling inbound and outbound components this 
creates further pressure on the workload for the warehouse personnel, thus leading to 
more materials waiting to be processed or moved within the shipyard.  
In addition, since C-components are typically ordered based on usage, stockouts can be 
relatively normal and caused by a sudden peaks in demand for components. As these 
are ordered with delivery next day from GS-Hydro, the waste of waiting for C-
components is also related to the time waiting for incoming materials from supplier due 
to stockouts at Ulstein’s warehouse, which in some cases can delay the production. 
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4.2. Value stream from Brunvoll to Ulstein 
Again, by referring to the research model outlined above, and the argument of 
Wegelius-Lehtonen and Pahkala (1998), the main focus of this supply chain link is the 
flow of information, primarily due to the comparable long lead time, ETO nature of the 
components flowing in this value stream and the relatively low logistics costs compared 
to purchase price of these components.  
In similar fashion as the GS-Hydro supply chain link, this value stream analysis is 
limited to the supply chain link including Brunvoll and Ulstein (tier 1 supplier and focal 
firm). In terms of product family, the materials flowing in this value stream are 
thrusters, categorised by Ulstein as strategic components (A- components), with a high 
unit value and low quantities per project. 
The focus and boundary condition are illustrated in figure 19 (in comparison to figure 
11). 
  
 
Figure 19: Focus and boundary conditions 
 
4.2.1. Flow 
As discussed previously, the information flow in a supply chain link between an ETO 
supplier and a construction project is often characterised by high level of fragmentation, 
complexity and uncertainty, while the material flow is characterised by a high level of 
change orders and long lead times.  
 
Again, by following a VSM approach, the next step is to create a current state map in 
order to highlight waste and improvement opportunities. However, in relation to the 
focus and boundary conditions described above, for this supply chain link this means 
creating a current state map of the information flow, with less focus on the material 
flow. For this value stream, the material flow is mainly considered for the internal flow, 
as data was not available for the manufacturing phase at Brunvoll. The information flow 
is analysed for Ulstein’s project no. 295, and includes delivery of three thrusters from 
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Brunvoll. This section will describe the current state of the information flow in the 
external flow between Brunvoll and Ulstein, as well as the material flow in terms of the 
internal flow at Ulstein.  
Clearly, there is also a flow of information between the different departments at Ulstein. 
However, this information flow is not explicitly analysed, but rather discussed in 
relation to the internal flow of materials.  
 
Although Brunvoll may get indications from the sales department at Ulstein at an 
earlier stage in the project about potential upcoming orders, the procurement procedure 
considered here starts with a tendering process. In the tendering process Ulstein initiates 
contract with Brunvoll with a request for quotation (RFQ). The RFQ is based on the 
specifications from the engineering department, which again is based on the order and 
specifications from the client (ship owner). A RFQ is typically sent to at least 2-3 
different suppliers. A supplier is selected mainly based on price, but also delivery date 
and specifications impacts the supplier selection. Within this tendering process, 
information flowing between the supplier(s) and Ulstein include technical information 
and documentation as well as negotiation both on a technical level, in terms and 
specifications and on a commercial level in terms of price, delivery date, and potential 
options to change the order. When agreement is reach with the preferred supplier, the 
final part of the tendering process includes sending a recommendation to the client and 
obtaining approval from the client for purchasing from the selected supplier.   
 
When approval is obtained from the client, the next process is the actual purchasing 
process where the order is placed with the supplier, in this case Brunvoll. Additional 
information flowing between Ulstein and Brunvoll in this process include decisions 
whether to implement options or not and technical documentation and drawings.  
 
The next process in the value stream is the production of the thrusters at Brunvoll. In 
the supply chain link between Ulstein and Brunvoll, this is the process where materials 
start flowing, since suppliers further upstream are not considered. The actual flow of 
materials in the production at Brunvoll is, as mentioned previously, not analysed since 
Brunvoll is not participating in the case study. However, there is a flow of information 
between the two parties during the production phase, including for instance drawings 
and documentation, both of a technical and commercial nature, change orders, and a 
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monthly update from Brunvoll on the progress and current schedule. The processes and 
flow of information between the involved parties is illustrated in figure 20. 
 
 
Figure 20: Map of value stream processes and information flow 
 
The main focus of the value stream after the production process is the (internal) flow of 
materials, from when Ulstein receives the components until the components are ready 
to be installed. This flow is showed in figure 21, where the black boxes in the Brunvoll 
column is only an illustration of the material flow before Ulstein receives the 
components.  
It should be noted that in some instances thrusters are delivered for primary outfitting to 
the shipyard constructing the hull in a low-cost country. However, for this study the 
delivery of thrusters to build no. 295 to Ulstein shipyard is evaluated.   
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Figure 21: Internal flow of components  
 
More specifically, build no. 295 is scheduled to be delivered to the client 30. November 
2012. In terms of the procurement of thrusters for this project, Ulstein’s purchasing 
department initiated contact with Brunvoll with a RFQ the 2. March 2011.  
The order consists of delivery of three thrusters, and the current schedule is to have two 
thrusters delivered on the 20. April 2012 and the last one on the 1. June 2012. The lead 
time from the RFQ was sent to suppliers to the current planned delivery is therefore 408 
and 449 days. The manufacturing lead time is calculated as the time from the order is 
sent to the original delivery date and is 334 and 347 days for the different thrusters 
(table 2). Clearly, this is the largest contributor to the total lead time, but the actual 
manufacturing process is not evaluated in this thesis due to the lack of access to data. 
However, from the interviews it was clear that Brunvoll’s manufacturing lead time was 
similar to other suppliers in the market, and the manufacturing lead time varies in the 
industry depending on the market environment and the types of thrusters.  
 
Table 2: Dates and lead times (days) on thrusters from Brunvoll for build no. 295 
 
 
Receive 
components
Ship Register 
components components
Store
components
Internal 
transportation
Ulstein
Installation
Brunvoll
Production
RFQ Supplier Order Original Scheduled Lead time Lead time Manufacturing 
issued selected sent delivery date delivery date RFQ-original RFQ- Scheduled lead time
02.03.2011 08.04.2011 26.04.2011 30.03.2012 20.04.2012 388 408 334
13.04.2012 01.06.2012 401 449 347
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4.2.2. Waste 
Waste is, as discussed above, anything that is not adding value to the end-product, and 
can be processes, activities or other structural arrangements. With respect to the supply 
chain link between Brunvoll and Ulstein, where the main focus is on the information 
flow, it can be argued that waste is more related to arrangements which increase the 
complexity, fragmentation and uncertainty of the information flow, rather than directly 
impacting the material flow, particularly as the manufacturing phase is not analysed. 
Instead, the waste may have a more indirect impact on the lead time and the delivery 
process.   
 
From the analysis of the information flow, particularly three features in the procurement 
process were identified as having a large impact on the lead time and the complexity of 
the information flow; (1) competitive bidding, (2) high level of customisation and 
change orders and (3) waiting for information in terms of documentation and decisions.  
First, when considering the actual lead time from contact was initiated to the current 
scheduled delivery dates, the process of competitive bidding, here calculated as the time 
from the RFQ was sent to Brunvoll to Brunvoll was selected as preferred supplier, 
amounted to 36 days, or 8.8 % (8% for latest delivery) of total lead time.  
In addition, it took another 18 days, or 4.4 % (4 % for latest delivery) of total lead time 
from Brunvoll was selected as supplier to the order was sent to Brunvoll. This time 
included obtaining approval from the client (ship owner).    
Consequently, in this case the process of competitive bidding and obtaining approval 
from client amounted to 54 days, or 13.25 % (12 % for latest delivery) of total lead 
time. The findings are summarised in table 3. Without the opportunity to evaluate the 
whole process in detail, it is not clear how much of this is actually adding value to the 
end product. However, it is clear that the process of competitive bidding is a large 
contributor to the total lead time, particularly when viewing the supply chain from 
Ulstein’s perspective. In addition, the tendering process clearly increases the 
complexity of the information flow, as at least 2-3 suppliers are involved in the process.  
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Table 3: Impact of competitive bidding on lead time 
 
 
The second feature of the information flow impacting the lead time was the high level 
change orders. For the thrusters for build no. 295, the contract with Brunvoll included 2 
options to change the order. One option was to change a super silent tunnel thruster to a 
combined azimuth/tunnel thruster, while the second option was regarding an extraction 
of the control panel and control system from the delivery scope from Brunvoll. In 
addition, there was a change order to increase the power of the thrusters.  
As the two options were included in the contract, Brunvoll was aware of the potential 
changes early in the process. This, in combination with the relatively early 
implementation of the two options, suggests that the options had relatively limited 
direct impact on the lead time. However, the options increased the complexity of the 
information flow, thus indirectly impacting the lead time. This impact will be further 
discussed below.  
In terms of the change order, this was included relatively late in the project. This 
resulted in 48 days delayed delivery of the combined azimuth/tunnel thruster because 
Brunvoll was waiting for an engine from a supplier. During the interviews it was made 
clear that this delay impacts the production plans and the project progress, as the work 
that can be done in the area where the thruster is to be installed is limited.  
 
The third and probably the most important contributor to the lead time within the scope 
of this study was the time parties in the supply chain were waiting for information in 
terms of documentation and decisions. This was made more evident due to the two 
options and the change orders, which added to the complexity of the delivery process.  
In terms of the documentation, this is an important part of the information flow in the 
supply chain, both in terms of commercial correspondence and technical 
documentation. The flow of technical documentation is important because Brunvoll is 
dependent on input from Ulstein to complete their drawings/components and vice versa.  
 
Lead time Days RFQ- % of Days supplier % of Days RFQ- % of
RFQ- Scheduled supplier sel. lead time selection-order lead time order lead time
408 36 8,8 % 18 4,4 % 54 13,2 %
449 36 8,0 % 18 4,0 % 54 12,0 %
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The findings suggest that most of the waiting for information in terms of technical 
documentation was related to when either Brunvoll or Ulstein was waiting to receive 
technical documentation from the other party. For instance, the delayed delivery of 
technical documentation from Ulstein to Brunvoll resulted in a 20 days delay in the 
delivery date for the tunnel thruster.  Furthermore, the interviews with Ulstein indicated 
that the information flow is fragmented and complex, as a large proportion of the 
information is sent on requests and after reminders from the party requiring the 
documentation. The documentation is often sent to the party “shouting loudest” and 
often sent when Brunvoll has made the documentation rather than when it is actually 
required. In addition, due to the large amount of documents, gathering all the required 
information and documentation was reported as one of the main challenges in the 
procurement process.  
In terms of the impact of waiting for decisions has on lead time, this was related to the 
time Brunvoll was waiting on a decision from Ulstein. In this case this was mainly 
related to decision of whether or not to implement the two options. The decisions to 
implement the two options were made 31 and 23 days after the original deadline, for 
option 1 and 2 respectively (see table 4).  
Although the direct implications on lead time and delivery date of this waiting for 
decisions to be made are not documented, it seems clear that it is adding extra time to 
the delivery lead time. It is, however, a difficult question whether this is adding value to 
the end product or not. On one hand, although not directly adding value to the end 
product, the longer decision time may be necessary and result in a better decision 
regarding the requirements of the client. On the other hand, the interviews gave the 
impression that the additional decision making time was not always necessary. In that 
case, the extra time does not add value to the end product, and should have been 
eliminated. 
  
Table 4: Dates and decision time (days) for implementing the two options 
 
 
 
Original New Implementation Revised order Days, original- Days, original deadline- 
Deadline Deadline confirmed based on option new deadline confirmed implementation
Option 1 16.05.2011 29.05.2011 17.06.2011 23.06.2011 13 31
Option 2 16.05.2011 29.05.2011 09.06.2011 14.06.2011 13 23
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In terms of the internal flow, the thrusters for build no. 295 were not delivered to the 
shipyard in time to specifically analyse the internal flow of the components.  The 
internal flow of A-components was therefore evaluated from a more general 
perspective. The interviews revealed particularly three wastes delaying the flow of 
strategic components; (1) excessive inventory, (2) excessive transportation and (3) 
waiting.  
 
The excessive inventory for A-components refers to having the components available 
too far in advance. However, as withdrawal of components from storage is not 
registered, there was no precise information available concerning the storage time for 
A-components. Instead, it was reported based on experience from employees in the 
warehouse function that the thrusters are typically installed within 1-2 weeks after they 
are received at the shipyard. This view was supported from the purchasing function, 
who reported that the thrusters are typically stored for at least a few days before 
installation.    
On the other hand, it can be argued that a safety margin may be necessary for strategic 
components in a Norwegian shipbuilding context due to the potential large impact on 
production plans a delayed delivery can have. However, in the current situation at 
Ulstein this excessive inventory results in excessive transportation and waiting within 
the shipyard.  
After arrival and registration of strategic components at the shipyard, the components 
should ideally be transported directly to the staging or installation area. However, the 
interviews suggest that this is not always possible due to space limitations, too early 
deliveries and/or it is unclear when the components are required in production. As a 
result, components can in some instances be stored where employees can find space 
until further notice when the components are needed in production, resulting in double 
handling and excessive transportation within the shipyard.  
 
Moreover, the findings suggest that delays in the internal material flow occur in terms 
of time components are waiting to be processed or moved, for instance due to peaks in 
the workload for the warehouse personnel responsible for receiving and moving the 
components or that the components are received too far in advance before they are 
required in production. For instance, there is currently no scheduling of incoming 
trucks, often causing different trucks and components arriving at the same time. This 
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can result in components waiting to be registered and moved to storage/production 
location. There is, however, a plan for when A-components are needed in production. 
Nevertheless, the interviews did not suggest that these plans were used explicitly to plan 
the transportation from the warehouse to the installation areas, and thus the 
requirements are often communicated to the warehouse on a “required immediately” 
basis. As a result there are often peaks in the workload of the warehouse personnel, 
which may result in components waiting to be moved to production areas.  
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5. Discussion and Conclusion  
 
5.1. Thesis discussion  
There are, according to Koskela (2000), three root causes of non-value adding 
activities; (1) the structure of the production system (value stream), (2) the way 
production (value stream) is controlled and (3) the inherent nature of production.  
Similarly, it has been argued that waste and delays in construction supply chains are 
caused by lack of planning, coordination and collaboration due to high organisational 
barriers, with each partner in a supply chain focusing on its own processes and financial 
gains, without considering the impact on upstream of downstream parties in the supply 
chain.  
Based on the case findings described above, this section will discuss what the sources 
of the waste and delays in the two supply chains appear to be. First, the sources of 
waste in the link between GS-Hydro and Ulstein will be debated. Second, the sources of 
waste and delays in the link between Brunvoll and Ulstein will be discussed, before the 
two supply chain links will be compared and contrasted.  
5.1.1. Sources of waste GS-Hydro- Ulstein 
Clearly, in the current situation, there are considerably amounts of non-value adding 
time, inventory and other processes and structural arrangements which are hindering a 
continuous flow of materials in the supply chain link between GS-Hydro and Ulstein. 
One could argue that this is due to the nature of Norwegian shipbuilding with its unique 
projects, concurrent engineering, high level of change orders and uncertain demand 
pattern for components. However, the findings suggest that although this has an impact 
on how the supply chain is and should be configured; it is not the main source of delays 
in the delivery process of components from GS-Hydro to Ulstein. Particularly, even 
though shipbuilding is project-based production, this supply chain is relatively 
permanent as evident from figure 22. The figure shows the number of orders per month 
from Ulstein to GS-Hydro in 2010 and 2011, and although number of orders and 
volumes vary, the figure illustrates that materials are flowing consistently through the 
supply chain.   
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Figure 22: Number of orders per month in 2010 and 2011 
 
Consequently, the waste in the supply chain cannot be explained by the one-of-a-kind 
nature of shipbuilding with corresponding temporary supply chains. Instead, the 
findings suggest that one of the main sources of delays in the supply chain link between 
GS-Hydro and Ulstein is the lack of coordination and cooperation in the interface 
between the two parties. This is particularly evident in terms of the sharing of demand 
information. For instance, the interviews revealed that GS-Hydro does not have any 
information about demand, neither type of components or volume, until the order is 
received from Ulstein. For larger deliveries of B-components (typically pipes) to a 
project, GS-Hydro receives an estimated demand for the whole project. However, the 
actual delivery of these components is typically communicated on a shorter term, and 
pipes for a whole project are normally delivered in some large batches.  
There are several examples on how this lack of coordination and collaboration impacts 
the delivery process in this value stream. First, due to the long lead time for some of the 
components (especially pipes) from suppliers to GS-Hydro as described above, GS-
Hydro has to procure based on forecasts which are based on historical data and some 
input from sales personnel (if available).  
This is where the one-of-a-kind production impacts the supply chain. Considering the 
one-of-a-kind nature of shipbuilding in Norway, the historical data are not accurate to 
predict future demand as typically no ship is exactly the same as another and different 
types of ships require different amounts of for instance pipes, i.e. an uncertain and 
fluctuating demand pattern. Figure 23 shows the tonnage per month shipped from GS-
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Hydro to Ulstein in 2010 and 2011, and illustrates the uncertain and variable demand 
pattern, while also confirming the permanency of the supply chain.  
 
 
Figure 23: Tonnage per month 2010 and 2011 
However, the point is that this historical data is often the only information available to 
GS-Hydro about future demand and thus GS-Hydro’s forecasts are wrong, resulting in 
GS-Hydro having excessive inventory in terms of too much volume, “wrong” 
components and out-dated components as described above. GS-Hydro can to some 
degree compensate for this demand uncertainty through their global consolidation of the 
procurement of their strategic components, which allow them to shift volumes between 
different warehouses in different countries. Nevertheless, the interviews revealed that 
the main challenge for GS-Hydro is to have the right inventory, both in volumes and 
types of components, due to lack of demand information.  
 
A second and corresponding example of the lack of coordination in the supply chain is 
the distribution of tonnage supplied from the central warehouse and the regional 
warehouse. GS-Hydro’s warehouse and distribution strategy is designed to supply 90 % 
of the orders from the central warehouse and 10 % as urgent orders from the regional 
warehouses. In the current situation, however, this is not the case, because Ulstein often 
place orders in the morning for the components needed the same day, which are 
components that have to be supplied from Ålesund. Hence, there is currently a 
mismatch between the ordering routines of Ulstein and GS-Hydro’s (optimal) supplying 
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routines. The result is both excessive inventory at the regional warehouse, and 
excessive transportation and transportation costs.  
This clearly indicates the lack of coordination and cooperation between GS-Hydro and 
Ulstein, and although the source of delays is mainly considered to be this lack of 
coordination, this also highlights the lack of planning at Ulstein and how this impacts 
the supply chain performance. As there is no formal planning concerning when 
components from GS-Hydro (B-components) are required in production, Ulstein often 
order on a daily basis what is required in production the same day. The reason for not 
including the B-components in the weekly production plans is to reduce the amount of 
details in the plans and the conditions that only “sound” activities should be included in 
the plans which again assume that the materials are available.   
This can be considered one of the core issues concerning the lack of coordination 
between Ulstein and GS-Hydro. Traditionally, Ulstein has ordered on a daily basis from 
the regional warehouse at Ålesund. When GS-Hydro changed to having a central 
warehouse, this was mainly a strategic change, as the warehouse at Frogner in practice 
had been a central warehouse even before the change, to take advantage of the 
economies of scale of having a central warehouse and consolidate transportation to the 
regions, thus ideally reducing double handling and inventory holding at the regional 
warehouses. The downside is the increased distance to the customer, with longer lead 
times. For GS-Hydro to take fully advantage of the new system in terms of handling 
and distribution costs, the customers have to order before 15.00 for delivery the next 
day. However, Ulstein has continued to order in the morning and demanding delivery 
the same day, thus GS-Hydro have to supply the order from Ålesund to satisfy the 
customer.  
The argument here is somewhat contradictory. On one hand, “the customer is always 
right”, and lean theory states that only what the customer, in this case Ulstein, perceives 
as value should be considered value adding. Therefore, one may argue that GS-Hydro 
should facilitate for this same day delivery to satisfy the customer (which they do in the 
current situation). On the other hand, from a value chain and lean SCM perspective, 
waste should be removed from the value stream through coordination and cooperation. 
This is an important point, because in the current situation, by demanding same day 
delivery, Ulstein does not consider the impact on downstream players in the supply 
chain and total supply chain costs, particularly as Ulstein have free shipping from GS-
Hydro, thus not having the to consider the extra transportation costs related to this.  
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In addition, it seems oddly high that for 39% (percentage of annual orders supplied 
from Ålesund with courier in 2011) of the total orders in 2011, the demand occurred 
overnight at Ulstein, thus actually providing value to Ulstein to have the components 
delivered the same day. Based on the interviews, it seems clear that the majority (if not 
all) of the requirements for production is known at least one day before the components 
are required in production, and thus the information is available to order from GS-
Hydro one day in advance. Therefore, this lack of planning combined with the 
traditional way of ordering from GS-Hydro is causing excessive inventory and 
transportation in the supply chain. Furthermore, this indicates that in the current 
situation the all-important value stream thinking in lean SCM is ignored, with each of 
the parties focusing mainly on own goals.  
 
Further examples of the lack of coordination and collaboration were found in the 
communication between GS-Hydro and Ulstein. For instance, the interviews revealed 
that Ulstein believe that when they send an estimate of the demand for pipes for the 
upcoming projects the pipes are located in the regional warehouse in Ålesund. 
However, GS-Hydro allocates the components ordered from Ulstein in their central 
warehouse at Frogner, and normally stores the components there until they are 
requested by Ulstein.  Similarly, it was reported that Ulstein in some cases order from 
GS-Hydro what they believe is an off-the shelf components in GS-Hydro’s inventory, 
which is actually a component GS-Hydro have to order from a supplier, thus having a 
longer lead time. These two examples illustrate the often poor information flow in the 
supply chain, where the two parties clearly have divergent views on the reality, which is 
interrupting a streamlined flow of materials. It should be noted, however, that the 
interviews revealed that both parties consider the relationship with the other at the point 
of contact as good. Nevertheless, the point of contact between the two parties are 
limited to the sales personnel at GS-Hydro and a few employees at Ulstein, and thus 
that they consider the relationship as good, does not necessarily imply a high level of 
coordination and an efficient information flow between the two parties.  
 
Correspondingly, the supply chain link between GS-Hydro and Ulstein is recognised by 
a high level of transactional or discrete contracting. For project specific B-components, 
the interviews revealed that Ulstein, as long as they have time for it (in the project), puts 
the order out for tendering to 2-3 suppliers. The supplier is selected primarily on price, 
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but delivery date and reliability also impact the decision. This high level of tendering is 
further showing the lack of cooperation and collaboration in the supply chain because it 
discourages value chain thinking in the supply chain, with each partner mainly focusing 
on own monetary short-term goals.  
 
The lack of coordination is not only evident on the interface between the two parties, 
but also within the shipyard. This is particularly evident when considering the 
information available to the warehouse personnel. As discussed above, the warehouse 
personnel does not have information about when components are required in 
production, or about the upcoming demand for C-components, before they are required. 
Similarly, the deviation between confirmed delivery date and actual delivery date, 
which is believed to often be caused by the purchasing department not changing the 
confirmed delivery date, is another example of the lack of coordination between the 
departments.  
 
This lack of information sharing between the departments at Ulstein also impacts the 
warehouse’s ability to plan and the lack of planning is also considered a source of waste 
within the internal logistics. Particularly, the inability to plan incoming and outgoing 
materials due to lack of available and correct information results in peaks in the 
workload of the workers as well as making it difficult to determine the suitable storage 
location. This again leads to the wastes of excessive transportation and waiting 
discussed above as well as poor utilisation of the storage space within the shipyard.   
 
In addition, the lack of control of the flow of materials within the shipyard can also be 
considered a source of waste, and this is mainly related to the lack of control of the 
inventory. For example, there is not control of or registration when B- and C- 
components are withdrawn from the inventory. As a result there is no information 
available concerning what is actually in stock, how long components are held in 
inventory, or whether the components are used for the right project. It was reported, for 
instance, that it is fairly common to “borrow” components from another project if the 
components where not in stock for the project it is required.  
Subsequently, there is no accurate information available to decide whether an activity is 
“sound”, other than that the components are received at the warehouse, and the 
assumption that the components have not been used for another purpose. The interviews 
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revealed that it does occur that components have to be ordered again, because the 
components cannot be found within the warehouse facilities, typically because they 
have been withdrawn for another purpose or project, or it is hidden behind other 
components. This illustrates how the lack of control can delay the flow of materials, and 
also emphasise the need for an improved information flow to improve cooperation and 
planning to reduce waste in the supply chain. This is further emphasised by considering 
the argument of Ala-Risku and Kärkkäinen (2006) that lack of information about 
materials availability often results in large inventory buffers on-site and excessive 
material handling.   
Consequently, the main source of delays in the flow of materials from GS-Hydro to 
Ulstein is the lack of coordination. However, this lack of coordination is closely 
connected with the lack of planning and control. Particularly within the internal 
logistics, these can be considered sources of waste and delays. The cause and- effect 
diagram in figure 24 summarises the findings and discussion of how the sources of 
waste are related and results in the three types of waste identified in this value stream. 
The next section will discuss whether GS-Hydro’s change to a central warehouse can be 
considered as a source of increased waste and delays in the flow of materials. 
 
 
Figure 24: Cause and effect diagram, GS-Hydro- Ulstein 
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5.1.1.1. Central vs. regional warehouse 
An important part of the background for this thesis, and the main reason for the 
involvement of GS-Hydro in this research, is the impact of GS-Hydro’s change to a 
central warehouse at Frogner has had on the supply chain performance. For instance, 
Ulstein reported increased variability in the deliveries from GS-Hydro since the change, 
especially in the beginning after the change. One can argue that the role of GS-Hydro in 
this supply chain is to be a buffer between the manufacturers (second tier suppliers) and 
Ulstein, to deal with the long lead time from manufacturers, particularly pipe 
manufacturers, and the fluctuating demand pattern from Ulstein. The challenge is 
therefore to locate the warehouse(s) to minimise logistics costs (including inventory 
holding costs), while providing the required service to the customers.  
 
From the findings there are no clear signs that GS-Hydro’s change to a central 
warehouse has significantly increased waste and delays in the flow of materials, rather 
the opposite, that less material is shipped through Ålesund, thus reducing double 
handling and transportation. However, the interviews did reveal that there were some 
problems in the beginning including some deviations and delayed shipments.   
Nevertheless, the change was mainly a strategic change as the warehouse at Frogner 
had been in a sense a central warehouse before the change, even though it was not used 
as one explicitly. The advantages of having a strategically central warehouse include 
economies of scale in procurement, transportation and handling and a larger assortment 
in the inventory.  
The main disadvantage of having a central warehouse, on the other hand, is the 
increased distance and lead time to the customers, which can result in delays being 
longer if they occur and also require more planning, especially in the case of Ulstein, 
from the customer, as the order have to be sent the day before the components are 
required.  
 
However, this is counteracted by GS-Hydro by having a regional warehouse, which 
should mainly service urgent, unexpected orders. The interviews revealed that the one 
of the main challenges for GS-Hydro was to change the mind-set of its own sales 
personnel who were used to having a regional warehouse. In addition, the use of 
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regional warehouses in the current situation is mainly due to the demands from the 
customers, were the sales personnel feel they have to accommodate this demand.   
During the research, however, it became clear that a central warehouse appear as the 
logical logistical solution in this supply chain and that the waste in the flow of materials 
to Ulstein, from a value chain perspective, is mainly a result of the lack of coordination 
and collaboration on the interface between the firms, regardless of whether Ulstein is 
supplied from a regional warehouse in Ålesund or directly from a central warehouse at 
Frogner.  
 
Particularly, considering this situation were some of the components in the supply chain 
have up to a year lead time from manufacturer, through GS-Hydro to Ulstein, one can 
argue that inventory is necessary in the supply chain, especially considering the 
unpredictable demand pattern from Ulstein. On the other hand, one wants the lowest 
costs possible in the supply chain. As a result, on may argue that a central warehouse, 
which can take advantage of economies of scale in the procurement and handling of the 
components, while having a larger product assortment than regional warehouse, is a 
suitable solution to balance the required service level while minimising costs in a 
complex supply chain.  
 
The main challenge in the current situation is therefore to configure the supply chain to 
be able to integrate the unpredictable and variable, but permanent demand from Ulstein 
with the finished goods inventory at GS-Hydro while maintaining a required service 
level, at the same time as minimising the logistics costs in the supply chain.   
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5.1.2. Sources of waste Brunvoll- Ulstein 
It has been suggested that waste in the information flow between a supplier delivering 
ETO-components and the customer’s own ETO construction project is typically caused 
by the supply chain partners lack of a systems perspective and the lack of coordination 
between parties. In terms of the material flow on-site, it has been argued that waste is 
often caused by the lack of planning and coordination between the supplier and on-site 
activities causing inventories and unproductive workers on-site.  
 
Clearly there are features in this supply chain that add to the lead time, without 
necessarily adding value to the end product. The findings suggest that there are 
particularly three sources of the waste in the information flow between Brunvoll and 
Ulstein; concurrent engineering, transactional contracting, and lack of coordination and 
cooperation. It is, however, difficult to determine the true value of these delays due to 
the complexity of the build no. 295, but this will be discussed further below. For the 
internal flow of materials, the findings suggest that the waste identified was mainly due 
to lack of planning and coordination.  
 
In terms of the additional time identified due to the customisation, options and change 
orders, this seems to be a result of the concurrent engineering. Particularly as build no. 
295, is a ship that is technological innovative, and thus some of the specifications were 
not fully established during the negotiation stage, which resulted in having the two 
options in the contract. Similarly, the additional lead time as a result of the change order 
can also be argued to be a result of the concurrent engineering. In addition, the delays 
identified waiting for decisions, can also be linked with the concurrent engineering, as 
this additional decision making time may have been necessary to have a better basis for 
making the decision.  
Therefore, one can argue that the extra lead time caused by the change order and 
options are necessary to be able to provide the right product to the end product. On the 
other hand, when considering the impact the delays can have on the production plans 
(especially for the thruster delivered in June), one may question whether improvements 
can be made in the engineering or in the communication between the engineering and 
procurement departments, particularly with respect to the decision making time, in 
order to reduce the delays. However, it should be emphasised that the interviews 
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revealed that this ship (no. 295) is a particularly complex project, thus requiring more 
complex engineering where actual specifications are more uncertain than usual.  
 
Furthermore, the interface between Brunvoll and Ulstein is recognised by a high level 
of transactional contracting, as the deliveries of thrusters to all of Ulstein’s projects are 
put out for tendering to at least 2 suppliers. At the same time, the findings suggest that 
the relationship have some of the characteristics of a relational relationship including 
supplier flexibility and trust which have developed over time as Brunvoll is normally 
participating in the tenders for contracts with Ulstein.  
 
Again, it is difficult to determine the true value of this competitive bidding process, due 
to, among others, the lack of information available concerning the actual cost savings 
obtained (if any) through the tendering and the cost in labour time of organising the 
tender. Nevertheless, some of the time of the competitive bidding process is used to 
define specifications, which would have to be done regardless of having a tendering or 
not, and thus the potential time saving of not having a tender is also difficult to 
determine. However, it seems obvious that the competitive bidding process increases 
the complexity and fragmentation of the information flow as for instance the 
specifications and potential change orders/options have to be discussed with all the 
suppliers participating in the tendering process.   
 
Therefore, the most eminent source of delays is the lack of coordination on the interface 
between Brunvoll and Ulstein. The findings suggest that this is mainly related to the 
level of the relationship between the two parties, and as the relationship has developed 
over the years the method for working together has become a little bit loose.  As a 
result, deadlines are not always complied with and assumptions are made in the 
communication between the two firms. It can be argued that this may be a consequence 
of the mixed relationship, with both transactional and relational characteristics. 
One example from the interviews is that although Ulstein may have the right, according 
to the contract, to penalise Brunvoll for not complying with for instance the project 
schedule, this may be limited in practice. Particularly, if the delays have been caused by 
Ulstein not complying with the deadlines themselves, the means to penalise may be 
limited in practice.  
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In addition, as mentioned above, one of the main challenges for procurement at Ulstein 
is to obtain all the information and technical documentation. Although this was not 
specific to the relationship with Brunvoll, it further emphasises the lack of coordination 
between the two parties. This may not, however, directly increase the lead time for the 
components, but it was suggested that it can be very time consuming and be a factor for 
why Ulstein order earlier than the actual lead time should indicate, to ensure all the 
technical documentation is received on time.  
This point also illustrates fragmented information flow between the different 
departments at Ulstein, with lack of coordination and adverse goals, which can be 
considered a source of non-value adding activities in the internal flow of components 
from Brunvoll. For instance, while the project coordinator/manager would like, at least 
traditionally, to have components delivered as early as possible to ensure on time 
delivery, the warehouse personnel would like to have the components delivered as close 
as possible to the installation date to avoid double handling and accumulation of 
components in the storage areas.   
Correspondingly, the lack of coordination and information sharing also creates 
difficulties for the warehouse personnel to plan the receiving of components, storage 
location and transportation to the installation area, as this information is often not 
available other than on an immediate basis, which may cause delays and waste in terms 
of excessive transportation, double handling and waiting. The sources and 
corresponding waste in the value stream from Brunvoll to Ulstein is summarised in the 
cause and effect diagram in figure 25. 
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Figure 25: Cause and effect diagram, Brunvoll- Ulstein 
 
5.1.3. Comparison  
Based on the findings from the two supply chains discussed above, this section will 
compare the two supply chains with respect to what is impacting or delaying the flow of 
materials and discuss why sources of delays are similar or different for the two supply 
chains.  
There is a clear difference with respect to the permanency and consistency of the two 
supply chains. While materials are flowing constantly, although volumes and types of 
components may vary depending on project, from GS-Hydro to Ulstein, the 
components from Brunvoll to Ulstein are flowing on a more irregular basis depending 
on the project. This was, at least to a degree, expected due to the nature of the usage of 
the components, where thrusters are strategic components low in number for each 
project and B- and C-components supplied by GS-Hydro are required in larger 
volumes. 
 
Furthermore, the two supply chains differ in respect of the supply chain structure, 
where Brunvoll engineer-to-order, while GS-Hydro has a large finished goods 
inventory. This is the main reason why the lead time differs significantly. As a result, 
the findings suggest that for the components from GS-Hydro the delays and waste occur 
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mainly in the flow of materials, such as excessive transportation and double handling. 
In contrast, in the Brunvoll-Ulstein supply chain any delays in the flow of materials are 
mainly as a result of delays or waste in the information flow, such as waiting for 
decisions to be made or waiting for documentation, particularly as the production stage 
has not been evaluated.  
However, when taking into account the long lead time (up to a year) GS-Hydro has 
from their pipe- suppliers (second tier supplier) who produce pipes to order for GS-
Hydro, the importance of information sharing and cooperation as one of the main keys 
to reduce waste in both supply chains is clearly illustrated, even though Brunvoll 
engineer-to-order and GS-Hydro ship from inventory. For Brunvoll to have the right 
information to the right time is essential for the completion the engineering and have 
the components available in order to deliver the thruster(s) on time. Similarly, 
information is vital for GS-Hydro in order to have the right components, in the right 
volumes at the right time, to be able to offer a required service level, at the right price to 
the customer.  
Subsequently, both supply chains share the lack of coordination and cooperation as a 
source of delays and interruptions in the supply chains. It can be argued that the lack of 
coordination in both the supply chains is a result of the high level of transactional 
discrete contracting between Ulstein and the suppliers in both cases. As discussed 
previously, this transactional contracting with a high focus on price tend to obscure the 
value stream thinking of collaboration and information sharing, with each of the 
involved parties mainly focusing on own short- term financial goals. However, the 
relationship between Ulstein and Brunvoll also has characteristics with relational 
contracting to a larger degree than the relationship between Ulstein and GS-Hydro. The 
findings suggest that this can be related to the long history between the two firms and 
the necessity to share drawings, specifications and similar between the two firms in 
order to be able to deliver the thrusters and complete the project.  
 
Conversely, some of the delays can to a larger degree be associated with the concurrent 
engineering nature of the shipbuilding in the case of Brunvoll compared with the supply 
chain with GS-Hydro. Particularly, for project no. 295, which is highly innovative and 
thus the required specifications are not always available or calculated before the order is 
sent to Brunvoll, causing delays in terms of waiting for decisions and change orders. In 
contrast, the components shipped from GS-Hydro are typically relatively standard off-
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the-shelf in their inventory, and with materials flowing consistently in the supply chain 
with a relatively short lead time, the delays cannot be associated with the concurrent 
engineering to the same degree.  
In terms of the internal flow, there are some clear similarities in the both the waste 
occurring in the flow of materials and in the source of delays, particularly for A- and B- 
components. The main reasons for these similarities are that the components are 
handled by the same personnel, have no fixed storage location and there is a lack of 
information for the warehouse personnel regarding when components are coming in to 
the shipyard and when they are required in production. On the other hand, due to the 
small volumes and large sizes of the many A-components, for instance a thruster, the 
delays caused by incomplete deliveries and/or deviations in the documents and the 
shipments or having to search to find the components are typically avoided for A-
components.  
The internal flow of C-components differs somewhat from the two other types of 
components, mainly due to the fixed storage locations and the ordering procedures. 
However, any delays occurring in the flow of materials upon arrival at Ulstein seems to 
be a result of the lack of planning and coordination of incoming trucks, regardless of 
type of components.  
In general, within the internal flow the wastes and sources of waste seem to be 
relatively similar for all three types of components. Although to what degree is varying 
between the types of components, within the internal flow the waste is mainly related to 
excessive inventory, excessive transportation and waiting in some form or another. 
Similarly, findings suggest that the sources are relatively similar for all the components, 
with the waste mainly being caused by lack of coordination and planning. It seems clear 
that these similarities seems to be a result of the same personnel handling all types 
(particularly A and B) of components and that the warehouse personnel lack accurate 
information to plan and coordinate the workload, receiving process, storage and internal 
distribution.  
 
In addition, for B- and C- components lack of control was also found as a source of 
waste. This was different from A-components mainly due to the larger volumes and 
smaller sizes of the B- and C- components, which makes visual control, in lack of 
registering of withdrawn components from inventory, more difficult compared to the 
larger A-components.  Table 5 shows an overview of the case study findings.  
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Table 5: Overview of findings 
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5.2. Conclusion 
The Norwegian shipbuilding industry is recognised by one-of-kind-production, a 
complex network of suppliers and being a cyclical industry, among others. In addition, 
increasing competition from low-cost countries has put pressure on the Norwegian 
shipyards to become more competitive.  
To meet these challenges Ulstein has been engaged in two lean shipbuilding research 
programs, with the goal of tailoring lean thinking to the project- based production of the 
Norwegian shipbuilding, and developing lean tools and methods specific to the 
industry. While the first research program mainly focused on planning and control, 
including the implementation of the Last Planner system, the second, currently on-
going program focuses on the project and social logistics.  
As a part of the second research program, Lean shipbuilding part II, within the project 
logistics focus area, this study has focused on qualitatively exploring and highlighting 
where and why waste occurs in the external flow of materials and information from a 
first tier supplier to Ulstein, as well as within the internal flow of materials at Ulstein. 
The focus was selected because this is the first study on project logistics for the projects 
at Ulstein, and therefore a qualitative exploratory-explanatory case study was used to 
highlight issues in the current situation.  
More specifically, this thesis has evaluated two different supply chains from a first tier 
supplier to Ulstein as the focal firm, with the aim of increasing the knowledge what 
type of waste and why it occurs in the supply chains. The first supply chain consists of 
Ulstein and GS-Hydro, a supplier delivering B- and C- components to the shipyard, 
while the second supply chain consists of Ulstein and Brunvoll, supplying thrusters, 
categorised as A-components to Ulstein.  
Lean theory focuses on the identification and elimination of activities that is not adding-
value to the end-product, i.e. waste. The aim is to develop a value stream where 
materials are flowing without obstacles or other delays, by pulling the product through 
the value stream based on downstream demand, through a process of continuous 
improvement focusing on maximising value to the customer while eliminating waste. 
Furthermore, lean philosophy focuses on improving the entire value stream, rather than 
individual processes and activities 
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Lean principles have been adopted by several industries outside the origin in the Toyota 
Production system, including lean construction, where the aim is to develop lean 
principles and methods to the peculiarities of construction. However, it is important to 
emphasise that application of lean to other industries than the car manufacturing 
industry from where it originates, is not about copying the tools and methods, but rather 
to develop own specific tools and methods to that industry, based on lean principles.  
Similarly, supply chain management theory views supply chains as an integrated value-
generating flow rather than a set of independent activities, and put emphasis on 
collaboration and coordination between stakeholders in the supply chain in order to 
satisfy the end- customers’ needs.   
Previous studies on construction supply chains suggest that waste in the value streams 
supplying A- components to a project is typically related to the information flow due to 
the long lead time, and particularly the time each party is waiting for information and 
documents. This is often caused by lack of standardisation and coordination on the 
interface between the supplier and the customer. For B- and C- components, on the 
other hand, waste is often related to the material flow, due to the shorter lead time. 
Excessive inventory and transportation are typical lean wastes in the value streams of 
these components, which is often caused by lack of demand information sharing and 
lack of collaboration between the parties. In addition, value streams supplying 
components to a construction project is often recognised by an unpredictable demand 
pattern, which adds to the uncertainty and complexity of construction (including 
shipbuilding) supply chains.  
Important aspects of a lean supply chain management approach include pulling to site 
demand, information sharing, collaboration, planning of delivery and materials 
management.   
The findings in this thesis suggest that waste in the supply chain link between Brunvoll 
and Ulstein is mainly related to the information flow, particularly as the manufacturing 
stage has not been evaluated due to lack of access to data. The waste identified was 
mainly related to waiting due to time buffers, which increased the complexity of the 
information flow and has a negative impact on the lead time. There is also a question of 
the true value of the time and resource consuming competitive bidding process.  
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For the supply chain link between GS-Hydro and Ulstein, waste was mainly related to 
the material flow. Lean wastes identified included excessive transportation, excessive 
inventory and waiting. Similarly, for the internal flow of materials within the shipyard 
for all types of components to some degree, waste was identified in terms of excessive 
transportation and inventory and waiting.  
In terms of the external flow of materials and information, both the supply chain links 
share the lack of coordination and cooperation on the interface between the supplier and 
Ulstein as a source of waste. These are the main sources of waste in the external flow of 
materials from GS-Hydro to Ulstein, while concurrent engineering and transactional 
contracting are other sources of the added to lead time and information flow complexity 
in the flow of information between Brunvoll and Ulstein.  
Sources of waste in the internal flow of materials for all three categories of components 
are considered to be lack of planning and coordination, while waste for B-and C- 
component also occur due to the lack of control in the value stream.  
Therefore, based on the lean theory and the findings of this thesis, it seems clear that 
lean SCM principles are applicable to the Norwegian shipbuilding industry in the 
pursuit of a continuous, more reliable flow of materials to the shipbuilding projects. 
First of all, the general idea of maximising value and eliminating waste is applicable to 
any industry. Secondly, many of the features of the shipbuilding industry such as fixed-
site of the shipyard and the permanent flow of B-and C- components from suppliers to 
the shipyard, points in favour of and facilitates for a lean SCM approach to the 
management of the flow of materials (and information).  
Particularly, when considering the four roles of SCM in construction proposed by 
Vrijhoef and Koskela (2000), it seems clear that a lean SCM approach is applicable to 
the Norwegian shipbuilding industry. From the findings in this thesis, especially two 
roles are applicable to the supply chains considered here, namely the focus on the 
interface between the supply chain and construction site, and the focus on the supply 
chain. In addition, the role of focusing on the integrated management of the supply 
chain and the construction site, by replacing temporary supply chains with more 
permanent ones, appears logical for the supply chains supplying A-components to 
Ulstein. Lastly, the shipbuilding industry is already based on a pull methodology, as for 
instance A- and B- components are ordered from suppliers based on the specific 
requirements of a project.  
113 
 
Furthermore, this has been the first study of shipbuilding supply chains with a lean 
perspective with Ulstein, and has highlighted that there is a significant amount of waste 
and non-value adding activities and processes, as well as structural and relational 
arrangements that is currently hindering a continuous flow of materials from the (first 
tier) suppliers to Ulstein. However, one can argue that these wastes and non-value 
adding activities can be reduced or eliminated through an application of lean SCM 
principles. 
Nevertheless, although lean SCM principles may be applicable to shipbuilding industry 
in Norway, it is again important to emphasise that this does not imply that tools and 
methods from other industries (including construction) should be directly copied and 
applied. Instead, the challenge for the Norwegian shipbuilding industry aiming to create 
lean supply chains is to take the lean SCM principles of continuous flow, pull, 
collaboration and value stream thinking, and develop an own set of tools and methods 
tailored specific to the individual needs of each specific shipyard and its suppliers.  
5.2.1. Managerial implications 
The purpose of this thesis has been to increase the understanding of what in the supply 
chains serving Ulstein shipyard that causes delays and/or interruptions in the flow of 
materials and why these delays occur. However, when comparing the case findings and 
discussion with the lean and SCM theory, some opportunities to improve the 
management of the supply chains and reduce waste in the flow of materials (and 
information) are apparent. 
First, for the management of the external flow of B- and C-components from GS-Hydro 
to Ulstein particularly three, interrelated, points stand out:  
 Increase demand (information) sharing between Ulstein and GS-Hydro 
 Focus on the interface between the supply chain and the shipyard 
 Focus on the supply chain 
 
The lack of information about future demand is one of the main sources of waste in the 
flow of materials between GS-Hydro and Ulstein. Therefore, increasing the sharing of 
demand information seems crucial to reduce waste and to have smooth flow of 
information. On a short-term level, operational basis, this could include Ulstein 
ordering from GS-Hydro at least one day before the components are required in 
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production. This may require some extra planning from Ulstein, but should reduce the 
inventory and excessive transportation related to the regional warehouse in Ålesund. 
On a more long- term, strategic level increased demand sharing may involve allowing 
GS-Hydro access to upcoming production schedules to forecast and plan their own 
inventory. Another option is to let GS-Hydro manage Ulstein’s inventory, and thus 
components are supplied and refilled from GS-Hydro without Ulstein having to order, 
thus ensuring material availability. This could be a solution to reduce waste in terms of 
excessive inventory and excessive transportation.  
However, it is important to emphasise that this would require both parties, and 
particularly Ulstein to have a more holistic value stream thinking approach, in contrast 
to the focus on own monetary goals in the current situation. For instance, Ulstein may 
not obtain reduced costs directly by reducing the excessive transportation and inventory 
holding in the external flow from GS-Hydro, because they currently have free shipping 
from GS-Hydro. However, Ulstein may obtain the gains indirectly to through lower 
prices and better supply conditions in general.   
Correspondingly, it seems clear, by following the roles proposed by Vrijhoef and 
Koskela (2000) that the focus should be the interface between the two parties, and 
thereby reduce waste in the flow of materials to the shipyard through increased 
cooperation and collaboration with the suppliers (GS-Hydro in this case). Particularly, it 
is considered that engaging in long-term relationship with only a couple or few 
suppliers for delivery of each product group would facilitate for the removal of waste, 
compared to the current price-focused tendering where each party is mainly focusing on 
own financial gains. Reducing the competitive bidding and shopping would also 
facilitate for increased information sharing and vice versa between Ulstein and GS-
Hydro.  
Furthermore, still considering the four roles of Vrijhoef and Koskela (2000), Ulstein in 
cooperation with the selected suppliers (in this case GS-Hydro) should focus on the 
supply chain, by focusing on developing specific supply chains, which both 
accommodates for the requirements of Ulstein, as well as taking into consideration the 
transportation and inventory costs. This may, however, include more cooperation on a 
higher hierarchical level between Ulstein and GS-Hydro, compared to the current 
situation where most of the communication takes place on a shop-floor level with only a 
few employees. 
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It is difficult to make for clear suggestions for the management of the information flow 
between Brunvoll and Ulstein as a whole due to the limited data material available, and 
thus the information flow was only evaluated from Ulstein’s point of view. However, 
for the management of the external flow of information, from Ulstein’s perspective 
between Brunvoll and Ulstein, three points stand out:  
 Standardise working and coordination procedure 
 Improve document flow  
 Standardise purchasing procedure  
 
By having standardised working and coordination procedures between Ulstein and 
Brunvoll, less time should be spent searching for the right person to contact waiting for 
documents, drawings, specification or other types of information. 
An important part of this is to improve the document flow, particularly to create 
working procedures between the firms that ensures for the right documents flowing at 
the right time to the right person.  
Similarly, it seems clear that by standardising the purchasing procedure, the complexity 
of the purchasing procedure, and thus also in the information flow could be reduced, or 
at least controlled to a larger degree. Moreover, it is also considered that this would 
improve the follow up of document flow and project schedules. 
 
In terms of the internal flow of materials within the shipyard for all types of 
components, the points below appear as improvement opportunities.  
 Improve information sharing and coordination between departments 
 Improve information accuracy  
 Improve planning  
 Improve inventory control  
 
Improving the information sharing and coordination between departments at Ulstein is 
related to ensuring that each department, in this case particularly the warehouse 
function, have the right information at the right time. 
Therefore, an important part of this is to improve the accuracy of the information 
available to the different departments, in this case particularly to the warehouse. This 
means that the information in the ERP system have to be up-to-date and reflecting the 
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reality, for instance for the expected delivery date, which is rarely accurate in the 
current situation. Similarly, the oral communication and procedures for withdrawal of 
materials from the warehouse, for instance by the foremen about upcoming 
requirements of C-components, should to a larger degree reflect the actual, concrete 
demand.  
 
Correspondingly, by improving the planning of in- and out-going materials of the 
warehouse, warehouse personnel should be in a better position to decide where the 
components should be stored, as well as enabling the warehouse personnel to better 
plan the workload, thus reducing double handling and waiting. Improved planning and 
coordination could also facilitate for delivering of materials from the warehouse to the 
installation areas on a more just-in-time basis, or even in work packages towards the 
vision of Ulstein, with less waste in terms of excessive inventory and double handling.  
 
Furthermore, the inventory control should be improved, particularly for B-components, 
as no information is currently available about inventory levels or materials availability, 
other than that the materials have been received and visual control. Therefore, 
improving the control is mainly related to registering withdrawals of materials 
(inventory tracking) from the warehouse, thus having information available about 
inventory levels and materials availability, which again should facilitate for improved 
planning and coordination.  
 
Finally, it should be emphasised that it seems important, in order to be able to improve 
the project logistics through a lean methodology, to communicate this throughout the 
firm and to (at least) first tier suppliers, such that each party, department and employer 
understands the meaning of the changes and the importance of value stream thinking, 
compared to the currently widespread “silo” focus.  
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5.2.2. Further studies   
This study has been the first study evaluating the project logistics for the shipbuilding 
projects at Ulstein. Naturally, as this study is part of the Lean shipbuilding part II 
research program, further studies should build on the findings of the current situation in 
this thesis, to further evaluate the applicability of lean principles and to develop tools to 
improve the project logistics at Ulstein.  
More specifically, further studies of the supply chain, flow of materials and/or project 
logistics with Ulstein, may have a more quantitative focus on waste and non-value 
adding activities, and how to reduce waste and to better manage the project logistics, 
and thus improve the flow of information and materials between the parties involved.  
Based on the findings in this thesis, particularly four research opportunities appear, 
mainly related to A- and B- components, as these have the main impact on project costs 
and schedule. First, how can waste in the external flow (in particular) of materials and 
information be reduced by Ulstein engaging in more relational contracting, with less 
use of tendering, with its suppliers. This is relevant mainly for A- and B- components. 
For A-components, this is related to whether less competitive bidding could make the 
information flow less complex and fragmented and more standardised. For B-
components this is related to how minimise the waste in the flow of materials and this 
could include the ideal number of long-term suppliers, or the feasibility of vendor- 
managed inventory.  
Subsequently, the second research opportunity is related to the actual impact of 
competitive bidding, in terms of labour costs, time used and the increased complexity of 
the information flow compared against the gains of the tendering process (mainly lower 
prices).  This is again relevant for both A- and B- components.  
The third research opportunity is to investigate the possibility of integrating the flow of 
materials in the Last Planner system to a larger degree. This could be a solution to 
improve the planning and coordination of incoming materials to the warehouse at 
Ulstein, and also the flow of materials from the warehouse to the installation areas.  
Following in the same lines, the fourth possible research opportunity is to evaluate the 
prospect of closing the warehouse at Ulstein, thus registering withdrawals from the 
inventory with only the warehouse personnel accessing the inventory. The impact of 
closing the warehouse would be an interesting focus, as it should facilitate for tighter 
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control of the inventory, including inventory turnover and cycle time, and for improved 
coordination and planning between the departments at Ulstein, which again could result 
in improved flow of materials within the shipyard.  
 
In addition, further study opportunities include quantifying the waste in the flow of 
materials identified in this thesis. This could include quantifying the time components 
are held in inventory (waiting), both at suppliers’ and Ulstein’s warehouse and 
measuring the double handling and excessive transportation in the flow of materials and 
the extra costs related to this.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix I: Description of case study participants 
Ulstein Verft AS
1
  
Ulstein Verft AS is located in Ulsteinvik, Møre and Romsdal, and is one of the main 
shipyards in Norway. It was established in 1917, as a family owned business engaged in 
ship repairs.  
Over the years, Ulstein has developed the knowledge base and experience that 
guarantees the highest standards of quality, execution and on-time delivery, through the 
successful building of state-of-the –art vessels for demanding marine operations.  
Today, Ulstein is building a wide range of highly-effective and sustainably efficient 
vessels. The company has unique expertise in engineering, installation, commissioning 
and upgrading, and places a strong focus on innovative technological solution and 
methods and on expertise within project management, effective logistics and pre-
outfitting techniques.  
Their work is based on a collaborative approach, with a continuous exchange of 
information between ship owners, designers, equipment manufacturers, engineers and 
shipbuilders, particularly within the maritime cluster in Møre and Romsdal in Norway. 
This, in combination with streamlined production processes results in a high level of 
flexibility and quality. One example of this is the development and innovation of the 
Ulstein X-BOW ® hull line design- a revolutionary hull design.   
Currently, Ulstein is a leading supplier of complex vessels such as:  
 Platform supply vessels (PSV) 
 Specialised/Multifunctional vessels 
o Offshore construction vessels (OCV) 
o Pipe laying vessels 
o Seismic vessels 
 Anchor handling tug supply vessels (AHTS) 
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GS-Hydro 
2
 
The GS-Hydro Corporation is a world-leading supplier of innovative, non-welded 
piping solution, both low and high pressure, for hydraulics, with a focus is on quality, 
reliability and cleanliness. Its headquarters are located in Hämeenlinna, Finland, and the 
company is operating in more than 25 countries around the globe. The company is 
renowned for its design and engineering knowledge, comprehensive services and high 
quality products.  
GS-Hydro’s product range consists of complete piping systems, including design and 
engineering, materials and components, prefabrication and on-site services. Within this, 
they offer supervision, installation, flushing and testing, as well as documentation, 
customized prefabricated piping modules and separate piping components and 
materials. Their piping systems are used in a wide variety of industries, from offshore, 
marine and land based industries such as the automobile and aerospace industry.  
GS-Hydro Norge AS is a wholly owned subsidiary of the corporation and is the largest 
of the corporations’ 17 subsidiaries in the world. GS-Hydro Norge AS is responsible for 
the operations in Norway, and the national main office and central warehouse is located 
in Frogner, Akershus. In addition, GS-Hydro Norge AS has six national branch offices 
with regional warehouses in Bergen, Horten, Kristiansand, Stavanger, Trondheim and 
Ålesund. Furthermore, the warehouse located at Frogner is also the central warehouse 
for pipes in Europe.  
 
Brunvoll AS 
3
 
Brunvoll AS was established in 1912 by three brothers with family name Brunvoll. 
Today, Brunvoll AS is still a family owned business located in Molde, Møre og 
Romsdal and is a worldwide supplier of complete thruster packages, including the after 
sales service. The thruster systems can be tailored to the specific propulsion and 
manoeuvring requirements of the customers, with a focus on reducing installation time 
and life cycle costs.  
Moreover, the company offers a complete technological environment with in-house 
expertise in hydraulics, hydrodynamics, electronics, mechanical and electrical 
engineering, and production. Within this technological environment, Brunvoll focuses 
on thruster production, including product development, engineering, propeller design, 
materials and components, machining, hydraulics, electronics and assembly.  In 
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addition, the company places a strong focus on quality, to ensure a long- life time of the 
thrusters, with low life cycle costs and maintenance.    
Currently, Brunvoll is a world leading supplier of thrusters, and the product range 
consists of:  
 Tunnel thrusters 
 Azimuth thrusters 
 Low-noise thrusters 
 Rim Driven Thrusters (RDT) 
 Thruster control systems 
 
1 
Source: www.ulstein.com 
2
 Source: www.gshydro.no, www.gshydro.com  
3
 Source: www.brunvoll.no  
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Appendix II: Extracts from archival records 
Log of commercial correspondence between Brunvoll and Ulstein for Ulstein build no. 
295 (data obtained from Ulstein)   
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dato Aktør Kommersielt Teknisk Tema
02.03.2011 U x Forespørsel
02.03.2011 B x Tilbud
02.03.2011 B x Forlenget gylidghet på tilbud
14.03.2011 B x x Div teknisk informasjon oversendt etter forespørsel fra UVE
14.03.2011 B x Revidert ti lbud pga telefonforhandling
24.03.2011 U x x Ber om opsjon på å bytte ut en retractable, med en ytterligere tunnel.
25.03.2011 B x x Etterspør teknisk info for å kunne tilby ytterligere tunnell
Ber om opsjon på uttrekk av kontrollsystem for thrusterne, og opsjon for å bytte
ut en retractable thruster med en kombinert tunnel/retractable thruster
05.04.2011 B x Tilbud på etterspurte opsjoner
08.04.2011 U & B x Møte ved Ulstein Verft. Gjennomgang av teknisk scope og forhandling.
Sender bestil l ing basert på møtereferat/kontrakt utarbeidet 08.04.2011.
 Leveringstid; Retractable  thrusters 13.04.2012, Tunnel Thrusters 30.03.2012
16.05.2011 info Opsjonsfrist 1; Bytte en retractable mot en kombinert retractable/tunnel
16.05.2011 info Opsjonsfrist 2; Uttrekk kontrollsystem for thrustere
Etterspør Ulstein sin avgjørelse ift opsjoner 
forståelse per telefon om at opsjonene i praksis fortsatt er gyldige)
18.05.2011 U x Etterspør forlenget opsjonsfrist ti l  senest 29.05.2011
18.05.2011 B x Bekrefter forlenget opsjonsfrist
08.06.2011 U x Erklæring av opsjon 2ifm uttrekk av kontrollsystem for thrustere fra Brunvoll sitt scope
09.06.2011 B x Bekrefter opsjon 2 implementert
14.06.2011 U x Sender revisjon1 av bestil l ing basert på opsjon 2
Erklæring av opsjon 1 ifm bytte ut en retractable thruster 
med en kombinert retractable/tunnel thruster
17.06.2011 B x Bekrefter opsjon 1 implementert
23.06.2011 U x Sender revisjon 2 av bestil l ing basert på opsjon 1
Informerer om forsinket leveringstid på Tunnel thruster ti l  20.04.2012. 
Dette pga forsinket levering av teknisk dokumentasjon fra Ulstein til  Brunvoll
02.11.2011 U x x Etterspør tilbud på å øke effekt på thrustere til  bygg 295 med 200 kW per thruster
04.11.2011 B x x Tilbud gitt, samt konsekvenser for leveringstid.
Sender revisjon 3 av bestil l ing basert på økt effekt på thrustere. 
Ny leveringstid på kombithruster 01.06.2012
Månedlig B x x Oversender fremdriftsrapporter månedlig 
xU04.12.2011
xU17.06.2011
xB14.09.2011
xB18.05.2011
xU31.03.2011
xU26.04.2011
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Extracts from orders from Ulstein to GS-Hydro in 2011 (345 lines in total, data 
obtained from GS-Hydro) 
 
 
 
Extracts of orders supplied from GS-Hydro to Ulstein in March 2012 with net 
transportation cost (52 lines in total, data obtained from GS-Hydro) 
 
 
Ordredato Avg. Dato År Mnd Uke Fra Lagersted Rute Kunde nr Kundenavn Vekt Antall Kolli
20.05.2011 23.05.2011 2011 05 21 001 - FROGNER Transferd Ålesund 30020 ULSTEIN VERFT AS 47,50 3
23.05.2011 23.05.2011 2011 05 21 001 - FROGNER Transferd Ålesund 30020 ULSTEIN VERFT AS 22,35 2
23.05.2011 23.05.2011 2011 05 21 001 - FROGNER Transferd Ålesund 30020 ULSTEIN VERFT AS 2,90 1
24.05.2011 24.05.2011 2011 05 21 001 - FROGNER Transferd Ålesund 30020 ULSTEIN VERFT AS 12,20 2
23.05.2011 24.05.2011 2011 05 21 001 - FROGNER Transferd Ålesund 30020 ULSTEIN VERFT AS 75,20 2
25.05.2011 25.05.2011 2011 05 21 001 - FROGNER Transferd Ålesund 30020 ULSTEIN VERFT AS 81,75 3
02.05.2011 25.05.2011 2011 05 21 001 - FROGNER Transferd Ålesund 30020 ULSTEIN VERFT AS 0,40 1
26.05.2011 26.05.2011 2011 05 21 001 - FROGNER Transferd Ålesund 30020 ULSTEIN VERFT AS 2,00 1
30.05.2011 30.05.2011 2011 05 22 001 - FROGNER Transferd Ålesund 30020 ULSTEIN VERFT AS 98,30 4
31.05.2011 31.05.2011 2011 05 22 001 - FROGNER Transferd Ålesund 30020 ULSTEIN VERFT AS 4,30 1
31.05.2011 31.05.2011 2011 05 22 002 - ÅLESUND Lehman 30020 ULSTEIN VERFT AS 100,00 1
31.05.2011 01.06.2011 2011 06 22 002 - ÅLESUND Lehman 30020 ULSTEIN VERFT AS 38,80 2
26.05.2011 01.06.2011 2011 06 22 002 - ÅLESUND Kvikkas 30020 ULSTEIN VERFT AS 9,00 1
06.06.2011 06.06.2011 2011 06 23 002 - ÅLESUND Kvikkas 30020 ULSTEIN VERFT AS 4,10 1
02.05.2011 06.06.2011 2011 06 23 002 - ÅLESUND Kvikkas 30020 ULSTEIN VERFT AS 30,00 3
07.06.2011 07.06.2011 2011 06 23 002 - ÅLESUND Lehman 30020 ULSTEIN VERFT AS 40,70 2
08.06.2011 08.06.2011 2011 06 23 002 - ÅLESUND Lehman 30020 ULSTEIN VERFT AS 80,50 1
09.06.2011 09.06.2011 2011 06 23 002 - ÅLESUND Bruk kode MØRE 30020 ULSTEIN VERFT AS 33,00 1
10.06.2011 10.06.2011 2011 06 23 002 - ÅLESUND Kvikkas 30020 ULSTEIN VERFT AS 1,30 1
14.06.2011 14.06.2011 2011 06 24 002 - ÅLESUND Kvikkas 30020 ULSTEIN VERFT AS 4,30 1
14.06.2011 15.06.2011 2011 06 24 002 - ÅLESUND Kvikkas 30020 ULSTEIN VERFT AS 9,70 2
15.06.2011 15.06.2011 2011 06 24 002 - ÅLESUND Bruk kode MØRE 30020 ULSTEIN VERFT AS 295,00 1
15.06.2011 15.06.2011 2011 06 24 002 - ÅLESUND Kvikkas 30020 ULSTEIN VERFT AS 33,00 1
16.06.2011 16.06.2011 2011 06 24 002 - ÅLESUND Lehman 30020 ULSTEIN VERFT AS 131,00 1
Lagersted Rute Ordredato Avg. dt Kundenavn Vekt Antall Kolli Pris netto
001 - FROGNER Transferd Ålesund 20120202 20120305 ULSTEIN VERFT AS 308,9 5 398,48
001 - FROGNER Transferd Ålesund 20120208 20120307 ULSTEIN VERFT AS 31,3 3 131
001 - FROGNER Transferd Ålesund 20120213 20120302 ULSTEIN VERFT AS 60,2 2 131
001 - FROGNER Transferd Ålesund 20120213 20120315 ULSTEIN VERFT AS 79,55 4 131
002 - ÅLESUND Kvikkas 20120224 20120305 ULSTEIN VERFT AS 4,9 1 121
002 - ÅLESUND Kvikkas 20120301 20120301 ULSTEIN VERFT AS 39,8 3 153
002 - ÅLESUND Transferd Møre 20120301 20120301 ULSTEIN VERFT AS 295 1 200
001 - FROGNER Transferd Ålesund 20120301 20120301 ULSTEIN VERFT AS 1494,7 4 777,24
002 - ÅLESUND Kvikkas 20120302 20120302 ULSTEIN VERFT AS 57,9 3 158
002 - ÅLESUND Kvikkas 20120302 20120305 ULSTEIN VERFT AS 2,2 1 121
001 - FROGNER Transferd Ålesund 20120302 20120313 ULSTEIN VERFT AS 531,7 4 494,48
002 - ÅLESUND Kvikkas 20120305 20120305 ULSTEIN VERFT AS 15,5 1 126
002 - ÅLESUND Transferd Møre 20120305 20120305 ULSTEIN VERFT AS 154 1 150
002 - ÅLESUND Kvikkas 20120305 20120306 ULSTEIN VERFT AS 2,8 1 121
001 - FROGNER Transferd Ålesund 20120306 20120306 ULSTEIN VERFT AS 87,6 2 136
002 - ÅLESUND Kvikkas 20120307 20120307 ULSTEIN VERFT AS 93 1 166
001 - FROGNER Posten Distribusjon 20120309 20120309 ULSTEIN VERFT AS 1 1 118
002 - ÅLESUND Kvikkas 20120309 20120309 ULSTEIN VERFT AS 55,6 3 158
002 - ÅLESUND Kvikkas 20120312 20120312 ULSTEIN VERFT AS 57,5 4 158
002 - ÅLESUND Kvikkas 20120313 20120313 ULSTEIN VERFT AS 43,7 2 153
002 - ÅLESUND Transferd Møre 20120313 20120313 ULSTEIN VERFT AS 469 2 494
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Extracts of orders supplied from GS-Hydro (hovedleverandor 8070 and 8746) to 
Ulstein, with expected delivery date in 2010 and 2011, (108 lines in total, data obtained 
from Ulstein) 
 
 
 
Extracts of orders from Ulstein (to all suppliers), with confirmed (bekreftetlevdato) and 
wanted (onskettermin) delivery date in 2010, 2011 and 2012, (31563 lines in total, data 
obtained from Ulstein) 
 
 
 
 
 
HOVEDLEVERANDOR LEVERINGSDATO ORDREDATO ORDRENUMMER VARREFERANSE
8070  17.02.2010 00:00 17.02.2010 00:00  17949 DRIFT               
8746  22.02.2010 00:00 17.02.2010 00:00  17950 DRIFT               
8070  09.07.2010 00:00 04.06.2010 00:00  18171 DRIFT               
8746  04.02.2011 00:00 31.01.2011 00:00  18634 DRIFT               
8746  13.01.2012 00:00 06.12.2011 00:00  19211 DRIFT               
8070  12.01.2010 00:00 12.01.2010 00:00  30029 10285               
8070  14.01.2010 00:00 14.01.2010 00:00  30038                     
8070  21.01.2010 00:00 21.01.2010 00:00  30051 10285               
8070  22.01.2010 00:00 22.01.2010 00:00  30055 10285               
8070  26.01.2010 00:00 26.01.2010 00:00  30065 10285               
8070  27.01.2010 00:00 27.01.2010 00:00  30068 10285               
8070  27.01.2010 00:00 27.01.2010 00:00  30072 REKVISITA           
8070  28.01.2010 00:00 28.01.2010 00:00  30073 10285               
8070  28.01.2010 00:00 28.01.2010 00:00  30080 10285               
8070  03.02.2010 00:00 03.02.2010 00:00  30091 10290               
8070  10.02.2010 00:00 10.02.2010 00:00  30103 10285               
8070  10.02.2010 00:00 10.02.2010 00:00  30109 10290               
8070  22.02.2010 00:00 22.02.2010 00:00  30134 10290               
8070  23.02.2010 00:00 23.02.2010 00:00  30146 10285               
8070  25.02.2010 00:00 25.02.2010 00:00  30160 10290              
8070  26.02.2010 00:00 26. 2.2010 00:00 30163                    
8070  01.03.2010 00:00 01.03.2010 00:00  30170 10290               
8070  02.03.2010 00:00 02.03.2010 00:00  30173 10290               
8070  11.03.2010 00:00 11.03.2010 00:00  30199 10290               
8070  15.03.2010 00:00 15.03.2010 00:00  30207 10290               
8070  16.03.2010 00:00 16.03.2010 00:00  30220 REKVISITA           
8070  19.03.2010 00:00 19.03.2010 00:00  30234 10290               
8070  14.04.2010 00:00 14.04.2010 00:00  30284 10287               
BEKREFTETLEVDATO INDKOBSORDRE_ID LINIESTATUS ONSKETTERMIN ORDRENUMMER PROJEKTNUMMER
12.02.2011 00:00 1878881084 SS 12.02.2011 00:00  18619  80056
04.10.2010 00:00 1479417600 SS 04.10.2010 00:00  18277  80073
05.10.2010 00:00 1970997152 SS 05.10.2010 00:00  18278  80073
15.03.2011 00:00 1821749831 SL 23.02.2011 00:00  85869  80736
31.08.2011 00:00 1248237979 SL 31.08.2011 00:00  19000  80056
19.01.2011 00:00 1318843382 SS 19.01.2011 00:00  18462  80056
22.11.2010 00:00 2065343872 SS 22.11.2010 00:00  18273  80073
12.05.2010 00:00 1390636565 SS 12.05.2010 00:00  18134  80910
12.05.2010 00:00 1390636565 SS 12.05.2010 00:00  18134  80910
12.05.2010 00:00 1390636565 SS 12.05.2010 00:00  18134  80910
12.05.2010 00:00 1390636565 SS 12.05.2010 00:00  18134  80910
15.03.2011 00:00 1821749831 SL 23.02.2011 00:00  85869  80736
15.03.2011 00:00 1821749831 SL 23.02.2011 00:00  85869  80736
12.02.2011 00:00 1878881084 SS 12.02.2011 00:00  18619  80056
12.02.2011 00:00 1878881084 SS 12.02.2011 00:00  18619  80056
12.05.2010 00:00 1218725802 SS 12.05.2010 00:00  18142  80910
20.12.2010 00:00 1440469455 SS 20.12.2010 00:00  18461  80056
20.12.2010 00:00 1440469455 SS 20.12.2010 00:00  18461  80056
20.12.2010 00:00 1440469455 SS 20.12.2010 00:00  18461  80056
12.02.2011 00:00 1878881084 SS 12.02.2011 00:00  18619  80056
12.02.2011 00:00 1878881084 SS 12.02.2011 00:00  18619  80056
12.02.2011 00:00 1878881084 SS 12.02.2011 00:00  18619  80056
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Appendix III: Interview guides 
Here, two of the interview guides used for the open ended-interviews is presented, one 
for the second round interview of the internal flow at Ulstein and one for the interviews 
with GS-Hydro. The guides were used as an outline of what aspects it was expected to 
investigate, but due to the open-ended nature of the interviews, other aspects came up as 
well.   
Interview guide for internal flow/warehouse at Ulstein 
 
General: 
What do you consider as the most common challenges/bottlenecks concerning the 
internal flow of materials? Does this differ depending on type of materials (ABC)? 
 
How would you describe the information flow between the departments internally at the 
shipyard? 
 
Inbound logistics: 
Is there any scheduling with respect to arriving trucks, and does the level of scheduling 
differ depending on type of product (ABC)? 
 
Is there any information available concerning when and what will be delivered, does 
this differ depending on type of component? 
 
Receiving: 
How is the receiving procedure and who conducts the receiving (dedicated personnel)?  
 
How and where are the incoming components registered? 
 
Does the receiving procedure differ depending on type and size of component (ABC)? 
 
Are the components received/registered immediately after arrival at the shipyard? 
If not, why? How long before they are registered? 
 
Does this differ depending on type of component? 
 
Storage:  
To what degree is the storage location fixed for different components and how is the 
storage location determined? 
 
Who is responsible for deciding the storage location, and where is the storage location 
recorded? 
 
How long are different components (ABC) typically stored? 
 
Picking 
How is material requirements communicated from the production function to the 
warehouse for the different types of components (ABC)? 
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Is withdrawal from storage registered of any kind? 
 
Who conducts the picking of production orders, does this depending on type of 
component? (dedicated personnel, warehouse personnel, production workers) 
 
Internal distribution: 
Is there any formal planning/scheduling for when components are needed in 
production? 
 
How are the components distributed from storage to production, and does this differ 
depending on type of component? 
 
To what degree and for what type of components are staging areas used? 
 
Who distributes the components from the storage location to production/staging area 
(dedicated personnel, warehouse personnel, production workers)? 
 
Interview guide for interviews with GS-Hydro  
 
General 
In general, how would you describe the current situation for GS-Hydro? 
 
How would you describe the current situation for GS-Hydro with Ulstein? 
 
Outbound logistics 
Can you describe the processes from the order is received to the goods are shipped? 
 
Approximately, how much is MTO to Ulstein and how much is shipped directly from 
inventory? 
 
What is normally the reason(s) if deliveries are delayed from GS-Hydro?  
 
Coordination in the supply chain 
How would you describe the buyer-supplier relationship with Ulstein? 
 
How is the contact with the customer(s) organised?  
 
Control in the supply chain 
Can you describe the processes from when the goods are sent from GS-Hydro (Frogner 
or Ålesund) to they are received at Ulstein? 
 
How are the goods/ transportation progress monitored/controlled until confirmed 
received at Ulstein? 
 
How do you monitor the inventory at the regional warehouses? 
 
Change to central warehouse 
Can you please describe the process and challenges of changing to a central warehouse? 
 
How did Ulstein (and other customers) respond to the change? 
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Appendix IV: Map of Ulstein Verft 
 
Source: sunnmorskart.no 
 
Appendix V: Map of location of GS-H Ålesund, Transferd and Ulstein Verft 
Source: Google maps 
 
